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State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations

S u p r e m e

C o u r t

In Re: Request of His Excellency, Theodore Francis
Green, Governor of the State of Rhode Island
and Providence Plantations, for an Opinion as to
the Validity of Legislation for the Calling and
Holding of a Constitutional Convention.
BRIEF O F THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL

OF
T H E STATE O F R H O D E ISLAND
In this matter, which is before this Honorable Court for an
opinion upon a question raised by His Excellency, the Governor, as to whether or not it would be a valid exercise of
the legislative power if the General Assembly should provide
by law for a convention to be called to revise or amend the
Constitution of this State, and on certain incidental questions concerning the organization and conduct thereof and
submission to the people of the results, if any, of such convention, the Attorney General of the State of Rhode Island
and Providence Plantations respectfully submits the following argument in support of the contention that it would be a
valid exercise of the legislative power if the General Assembly should provide by law for a convention to be called to
revise, rather than amend, the Constitution of the State.
A. The General Assembly can legally call a constitutional convention to revise the Constitution of the State
notwithstanding the fact that said Constitution by Article
XIII thereof permits the General Assembly to propose
amendments but omits to provide for the holding of a
constitutional convention.
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I

The peop

stitutions of government.
a. This principle is stated in Article I, Section 1, of our
Constitution, as follows:
«
we declare that the basis of our political systems
is the right of the people to make and alter their constitutions of g o v e r n m e n t ; . . . . "
George Washington is quoted as being the author
thereof.
1. In said section, prior to this declaration we find this:
"We do declare that the essential and unquestionable
rights and principles hereinafter mentioned shall be
established, maintained, and preserved, and shall be
of paramount obligation in all legislative, judicial,
and executive proceedings."
2. Said section further declares that the people have
power to change their constitution :
aa. In said section we find this:
"but that the constitution which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act
of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon
all."
These were Washington's words, also.

b. This principle is generally extant;
1. Resolution of Rhode Island Convention of 1790 which
ratified the Federal Constitution:
"That the powers of government may be re-assumed
by the people, whensoever it shall become necessary
to their happiness."
2. Declaration of Independence:
"We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men
are created equal; that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable rights; t h a t among
these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;
that to secure these rights governments are instituted
among men, deriving their just powers from the con-

79
sent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on
such principles and organizing its powers in such
form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their
safety and happiness."
3. Virginia Constitution:
"When any government shall be found inadequate or
contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, inalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish it, in such
manner as shall be judged most conducive to the
public w e a l ; . . . . "
4. Massachusetts Constitution:
"Whenever these great objects are not obtained, the
people have a right to alter the government, and to
take measures necessary for their safety, prosperity
and happiness. The people alone have an incontestable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to institute
government; and to reform, alter or totally change
the same, when their protection, safety, prosperity
and happiness require it."
5. Pennsylvania Constitution:
"Whenever these great ends of government are not
obtained, the people have a right, by common consent, to change it, and take such measures as to them
may appear necessary to promote their safety and
happiness . . . . The community hath an indubitable,
unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter
or abolish government in such manner as shall be by
t h a t community judged most conducive to the public
weal."
6. Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Indiana 336:
"To erect the state, to institute the form of its government, is a function inherent in the sovereign people; to carry out its purpose of protecting and enforcing the rights and liberties of which the ordained
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Constitution is a guaranty by enacting rules of civil
conduct relating to the details and particulars of the
government instituted, is the function of the Legislature under the general grant of authority. It needed no reservation in the organic law to preserve to
the people their inherent power to change their government against such a grant of legislative authority; and yet we find in the first section of the first
article of the Constitution this statement of the purpose of the government which they had builded, and
the declaration of their power over i t : 'We declare
that all men are created equal; that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that
among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that all power is inherent in the people; and
that all free governments are, and of right ought to
be, founded on their authority, and instituted for
their peace, safety, and well-being. F o r the advancement of these ends, the people have, a t all times, an
indefeasible right to alter and reform their government'."

c. Government in America is based upon popular sovereignty; and said principle is given effect through
representative government.
1. Constitution of the United States:
"We, the people of the United States . . . . do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United States
of America."
2. Constitution of Rhode Island:
"We, the people of the State of Rhode Island and
Providence Plantations . . . . do ordain and establish
this constitution of government."
3. Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, P. 1:
"Of the American system of government, the two
leading principles are, first, t h a t laws and Constitutions can be rightfully formed and established only
by the people over whom they are to be put in force;
and, secondly, that the people being a corporate unit,
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comprising all the citizens of the State, and, therefore, too unwieldy to do this important work directly,
agents or representatives must be employed to do it,
and that, in such numbers, so selected, and charged
respectively with such functions, as to make it reasonably certain that the will of the people will be
not only adequately but speedily executed."

d. This right is in some cases legal; in others revolutionary.
1. Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, P. 236:
"The second class of documents consists of Bills of
Rights of a large number of our Constitutions, containing broad general assertions of the right of a
people to alter or abolish their form of government,
at any time, and in such manner as they may deem
expedient. The peculiarity of these documents is,
that they seem to assert the right in question as a
legal right; at least, they furnish a plausible argument for those who are willing to have it believed
t h a t the right is a legal one; when, in fact, it is a
revolutionary right. The framers of those Constitutions generally inserted in them provisions for their
own amendment. Had nothing f u r t h e r been said, it
might have been inferred, that no other mode of securing needed changes was under any circumstances
to be pursued, but they prescribed in those instruments. Such, however, was not the intention of their
framers. They meant to leave to the people, besides,
the great right of revolution, formally and solemnly
asserted in the Declaration of Independence. They,
therefore, affirmed it to be a right of the people to
alter or abolish their Constitutions, in any manner
whatever; that is, first, legally, in the mode pointed
out in their Constitutions, or BY T H E CUSTOMARY LAW
OF THE LAND; and, secondly, illegally, that is, for sufficient causes, by revolutionary force."
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II. Revision or alteration of the Constitution brought about
by the will of the people assembled under such legislative provisions as may be necessary to ascertain that
will truly and authentically is valid, and legal as having
been brought about "BY THE CUSTOMARY LAW O F
THE LAND."
a. There is "one uniform current of law, of precedent,
and of practice" to this effect.
1. Daniel Webster:
"We see, therefore, from the commencement of the
government under which we live down to this late act
of the State of New York, one uniform current of
law, of precedent, and of practice, all going to establish the point that changes in government are to be
brought about by the will of the people assembled
under such legislative provisions as may be necessary to ascertain that will, fully and authentically."
NOTE: The Act of the State of New York thus quoted by
Mr. Webster, and which he had dwelt upon in detail as an
illustration of American Constitutional law, was an act of
legislation providing for a constitutional convention under
an existing constitution, containing a provision for amendment through a majority vote of one Legislature, followed
by publication and a two-thirds vote of the next Legislature,
and a majority vote of the people. I t contained no provision
for calling a convention, and no declaration of rights upon
the subject.
Webster thus describes the a c t :
"One of the most recent laws for taking the will of the
people, in any state, is the law of 1845, of the State of
New York. I t begins by recommending to the people to
assemble in their several election districts, and proceed
to vote for delegates to a convention. If you will take
pains to read that act, it will be seen that New York
regarded it as an ordinary exercise of legislative power.
It applies all the penalties for fraudulent voting, as in
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other elections. I t punishes false oaths as in other cases,
certificates of the proper officers were to be held conclusive, and the will of the people was, in this respect, collected essentially in the same manner, supervised by the
same officers, under the same guards, against false and
fraudulent collusion and misrepresentation, as are used
in voting for state or United States Officers."
2. Act of 1824 of Rhode Island General Assembly:
A t the J a n u a r y 1824 session of the General Assembly
there was passed an act entitled: "An Act to authorize the holding of a Convention for the purpose of
forming a written Constitution of Government for
this State." I t was therein provided that the freemen
of the several towns within this State, qualified to
vote for general officers therein, be requested, a t the
annual town meetings in the following April, to
choose delegates to attend a convention for the purpose of framing a written constitution of government
for this State; t h a t the delegates thus chosen should
meet a t Newport on J u n e 21st; that after said convention should have framed such a constitution of
government as they should think proper, the same
should be submitted to the freemen for their ratification in town meeting, to be called or holden at such
time as should be directed by said convention; and
that, if such constitution should be ratified as provided in said act, it should go into effect.
3. At the J u n e 1834 session of the General Assembly
there was passed an act entitled: "An Act to provide
for holding a convention for the purposes therein
mentioned," and it provided that a convention should
be holden at Providence, on the first Monday of the
following September, "for the purpose of amending
the present or proposing a new constitution for this
State" and the freemen were requested to choose del-
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egates thereto at the semi-annual town or ward meetings in August.
4. At the January 1841 session of the General Assembly
a joint resolution to the same effect was passed calling a Constitutional Convention to meet a t Providence in November, 1841.
5. To the same effect was an act passed at the J u n e 1842
session of the General Assembly calling a convention
to meet at Newport in September.
6. At the May session, 1853, the General Assembly
passed an act entitled: "An Act recommending a
Convention of the people of the State, to form a Constitution for the State," which commences as follows :
"Section 1. The people of this State are hereby invited and requested to give in their ballots at their
town or ward meetings, to be holden on Tuesday, the
28th day of J u n e next, in relation to the Convention
hereinafter provided for, on such ballots shall be
printed or written, or partly printed or written, by
those voters who are in favor of the proposed convention, the word 'Convention', and by those voters who
are opposed thereto, the words 'No Convention';" and
said act further provided that if a majority of votes
should be cast in favor of a convention it would be
taken to be the will of the people t h a t a convention
should meet, and that the Governor should by proclamation convene the delegates elected "as hereinafter provided," to meet in Convention for the purpose of forming a constitution of government for the
State; and that the people were invited and requested, "at the time and place aforesaid", to elect delegates to meet in convention on the 9th day of August
for the purpose of forming a constitution."
7. At the October Session 1853, the General Assembly
passed an Act entitled: "An Act recommending a
Convention of the people of the State to revise the
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Constitution of the State," whereby the people were
invited and requested to vote, on November 21st, on
the question whether the delegates, elected on J u n e
28, 1853, under the terms of the Act passed at the
May Session, recommending a convention, should
"convene for the purpose of considering the expediency of framing a Constitution of government for
this State, differing from the present Constitution in
these specific and only particulars, to w i t : "and that,
if a majority should vote in the affirmative, a convention should be convened."
8. Massachusetts—1853:
(aa) The following question was submitted to the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts for an opinion : "Can any specific and particular
amendment or amendments
to the Constitution be
made in any other manner than that prescribed
in the Ninth Article of the Amendments adopted in 1820?"
To this question the judges replied, that—
"Considering that, previous to 1820, no mode
was provided by the Constitution for its own
amendment, that no other power for t h a t purpose than in the mode alluded to is anywhere
given in the Constitution, by implication or
otherwise, and that the mode thereby provided
appears manifestly to have been carefully considered, and the power of altering the Constitution thereby conferred to have been cautiously
restrained and guarded, we think a strong implication arises against the existence of any
other power, under the constitution,
for the
same purposes."
(i) In Section 574, Jameson, the author, says
as to t h i s :
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"To this question the answer ought to
have been in the negative, since it inquired
as to the lawfulness of doing the same
thing in a different way from that prescribed by the Constitution."
(bb) The constitutional convention was held notwithstanding the opinion.
(i) In that Convention, Marcus Morton, who
was one of the judges who gave the opinion
and who was twice Governor of the State,
said:
"Whether we sit legally or illegally, whether
by right or usurpation, if the people choose
to adopt what we submit to them, it then
becomes authority."
(ii) Joel Parker, a former Chief Justice of New
Hampshire and a delegate to the convention, said:
" I t is well known t h a t the argument has
been advanced that this convention was revolutionary in its character because the constitution provided no such mode in which a
convention could legally assemble; that
there was one mode provided by the constitution for the revision of t h a t instrument,
and any other mode is in its nature revolutionary. For myself, personally, I do not
entertain that opinion. I believe this convention to have been lawfully
assembled,
and that it is bound to proceed according to
law."
9. Constitutions have been adopted through the action
of conventions assembled pursuant to a law of the
existing legislature in almost all the cases, if not in
all in which constitutions have been created or renewed. And this, whether the constitution contained
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a special provision for calling a convention or not,
and also whether it contained a provision for legislative amendment or not, and whether the latter stood
alone in the constitution or with a provision for a
convention.
(aa) Dodd, The Revision and Amendment of State
Constitutions, P. 44:
" I t has now become the established rule that
where the constitution contains no provision
for the calling of a convention, but has no provision expressly confining amendment to a particular method, the legislature may provide by
law for the calling of a convention—that is, the
enactment of such a law is within the power of
the legislature unless expressly forbidden, and
is considered a regular exercise of legislative
power."
(bb) Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, P.
210:
"The second subdivision consisting of Conventions called for legitimate constitutional purposes by the respective State legislatures, under
their general legislative power, without the special authorization of their Constitutions, comprises twenty-seven Conventions."
(cc) Other such conventions have been held in Missouri (1890), Louisiana (1898), Connecticut
(1902), Massachusetts (1917).
(dd) Roger Sherman Hoar, Constitutional Conventions, P. 41:
"There are now twelve states which have no express constitutional provisions for the calling
of conventions, yet in eight of these: Arkansas,
Connecticut, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Massachusetts,
conventions have been held without any serious
question being made as to their legality."
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"In Vermont the special commission appointed
in 1908 . . . suggested the possibility of holding
a convention."
"The Supreme Court of Indiana has asserted
the legality of this Convention."
10. Reconstruction Conventions.
Charles S. Bradley, "The Method of Changing the
Constitution of the States, etc."—P. 25:
"When changes became necessary in the constitutions of the states which attempted to secede, Congress provided that the ante-bellum constitutions
should be changed through the medium of conventions, and not according to the method provided in
them for amendment through the Legislature."
"The States of Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Texas had in
their constitutions preceding the war the same
provisions for amendment that we have in Rhode
Island, without any provisions for a convention.
And the proper method of change under them was
deemed in Congress and in those States, to be by
Convention, and not by legislative amendment."

b. This contention accords with principle.
1. Jameson, Constitutional Conventions, Sec. 219:
"Whenever a Constitution needs a general revision,
a Convention is indispensably necessary; and if there
is contained in the Constitution no provision for such
a body, the calling of one is believed to be directly
within the scope of the ordinary legislative power."
"Were it not a proper exercise of legislative power,
the usurpation has been so often committed with the
general acquiescence, that it is now too late to question it as such. I t must be laid down as among the
established prerogatives of our general assemblies,
that, the Constitution being silent, whenever they
deem it expedient they may call conventions to revise
the fundamental law."
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2. Jameson, Sec. 394:
"The assertion that where express authority to call a
Convention has not been given by the Constitution, a
legislature has no power to do it, I deem to be unfounded, for two reasons: first, as contravening
sound political principle; and secondly, as falsified
by well-established usage under the American
system."
"under the general grant of legislative power found
in our State Constitutions, a legislature is competent
to provide by law for all exigencies requiring provisions of a legislative nature, so f a r as it is not restrained by rules of morality, or by express constitutional inhibitions. This is believed to cover the whole
case."
"Nor is it true . . . . that the giving to the legislature
in a Constitution express power to recommend specific amendments to that instrument, involves by implication, the denial to that body of power to call
conventions for a general revision of it."
"Such a grant is applicable only to disconnected and
unimportant amendments. I t is obvious that a grant
of power to propose such amendments in a summary
manner, and without the formalities ordinarily attending the enactment of fundamental laws, cannot
be considered as an implied prohibition to effect a
general revision of a Constitution in the only appropriate and practicable "way, by a Convention. If it be
not in the power of a legislature to call a Convention,
t h a t fact is not to be inferred from a positive authority to effect a different object in a different way. The
idea advanced by the Court is based on the legal
maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius—a maxim doubtless of wide application in the construction
of ordinary statutes, and of contracts between man
and man, but whose applicability to the construction
of fundamental laws has been denied or doubted by
high authority."
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" I t is too late to deny the right of a legislature, in
the absence of express constitutional authority, to
call a Convention, . . . Though doubtless considered
irregular in its earlier stages, the usage has become
established for legislatures to take the initiative in
such cases, as of course; and since the year 1820,
when the New York Council of Revision vetoed a
Convention Bill because the legislature had passed it
without providing for a submission of it to the people, not as being beyond its power, but as inexpedient,
the power ha# very frequently been exercised

III. If the General Assembly, by a legislative act, exercises
its legal right to call a convention, the convention may
legally assemble.
a. It has this power granted to it by our Constitution:
1. Article IV, Section 10:
"The General Assembly shall continue to exercise
the powers they have heretofore exercised, unless
prohibited in this constitution."
Chief Justice Bradley said: (p. 28)
"That the power to pass an act providing for a
convention of the people of a State to reconstruct
their State constitution exists in the Legislature
of a State, unless it has been prohibited, no one
will dispute. It need not be specifically
granted.
I t exists by force of this creation, or in grant to
one branch of the government of general legislative power."
Also, (p. 31)
"Under the charter government, the general assembly possessed all powers. Many of the people of the
state preferred this patriarchal government to the
division of powers systematically arranged in the
usual State constitution. . . . While granting a constitution, they yet incorporate in it the provision
that the General Assembly shall continue to exercise the powers they have hitherto exercised unless
prohibited by the constitution. Among those powers
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was that of calling a Constitutional Convention.
Had they meant to have excluded that power, they
would have said so."
2. Article I, Section 23:
"The enumeration of the foregoing rights shall not
be construed to impair or deny others retained by
the people."
3. Dodd, p. 46:
"The calling of conventions by legislative action
alone, without requiring the submission of the question to a vote of the people, has been the method
adopted by a few states, . . . Then, too, when no provision is contained in a state constitution regarding
the calling of a convention, it would seem to be
within the discretion of the legislature as to whether the question should be submitted to the people"
Examples: Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Missouri, Arkansas, North Carolina, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Reconstruction Conventions.
4. Jameson, p. 111:
"There may, then, be two cases: first, where the
legislature itself passes upon the question of calling
a Convention, without the intervention of the electoral body; and, secondly, where the legislature first
recommends a call, then refers the question to a
vote of the electors, and, finally, on an affirmative
vote by the latter issues the call."
5. Jameson, Section 121:
"The legislature is the fittest body to act upon the
question of calling a Convention, because of all
questions t h a t is most dependent, for a proper decision, on a wise balancing of expediencies.... In this
respect, the legislature is, of all public bodies, that
which is best adapted to this particular work. I t is
its prime function to determine the expedient. Besides, of all representative bodies, excepting only the
electors, it is, under all forms of government, the
most numerous."
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6. Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 59:
"Mr. Webster stated in 1848, in his argument before
the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case
of Luther vs. Borden, 'that of the old thirteen
states, their Constitution with but one exception
contained no provision for their own amendment,
yet there is hardly one that has not altered its Constitution, and it has been done by conventions called
by the legislature, as an ordinary exercise of power'."
"If this is t r u e . . . it would seem as though the question as to whether the calling of a constitutional
convention was a legal exercise of power by the legislature, should now be considered by all judicial
tribunals as settled so firmly as a part of the common law of our governments, that any attempt to
disturb it at this day would savor more of revolution than legitimacy."
7. Our Constitution contains no express prohibition
in relation to the calling of a constitutional convention.
8. No such prohibition can be implied,
(aa) Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 59:
"The conclusion I have drawn from all this is,
that there is underlying our whole system of
American government a principle of acknowledged right in the people to change their Constitutions, except where especially
prohibited
in a Constitution itself, in all cases and at all
times, whether there is a way provided in
their Constitutions or not, by the interposition of the legislature, and the calling of a
convention as was done in the case at hand."
(bb) Charles S. Bradley, p. 26:
"This rule (expressio unius est exclusio alterius) does not apply to provisions in a statute,
so as to take away any right of the sovereign
power."
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" 'The rights of the crown can never be taken away
by doubtful words or ambiguous expressions, but
only by express terms.'—Dwarris on Statutes, 706.
"The good sense of this qualification is manifest.
Any legislation which is to affect the sovereign power should not leave the right to mere inference. It
should be direct, especially in constitutions addressed to the popular mind and adopted by i t ; a
great sovereign right should not be left to legal conjecture and implication. The people, in such proceedings, say what they mean. They do not leave a
negation of one power to be inferred from the grant
of another. The rule does not apply, again, in a
statute so as to take away a right previously existing under the common law, or by custom, or by a
preceding statute. I t applies only to statutes by
which all the rights claimed under it are granted
by it.
'Affirmative words do not take away the common
law, a former custom, or a preceding statute'."—
Dwarris, 712.
"The right here in question exists by the common
law of the constitutions of American states, as we
have seen by the former customs of this and other
states."
"Mr. Webster says: 'Every State is an independent, sovereign, political community except in so
f a r as certain powers, which it might otherwise
have exercised, have been conferred on a general
government, established under a written constitution, and exercising its authority over the people of all the States. This general government is
a limited government. I t s powers are specific and
enumerated. All powers not conferred on it still
remain with the States or with the people. The
State Legislatures, on the other hand, possess all
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usual and ordinary powers of government, subject
to any limitations which may be imposed by their
own constitutions, and with the exception, as I
have said, of the operation on those powers of the
constitution of the United States.' "
"That the power to pass an act providing for a convention of the people of a State to reconstruct their
State constitution exists in the Legislature of a
State, unless it has been prohibited, no one will dispute. I t need not be specifically granted. I t exists
by force of this creation, or in grant to one branch
of the government of general legislative power. The
Legislature of our State has that power, unless prohibited, as a part of its prerogative and right; not
ex-necessitate, as the opinion says. There is, therefore, no room for any implied prohibition, for there
is an express grant of the power in question by a
general grant of legislative powers, which include
it."
"The rule does not apply, for the f u r t h e r reason,
that the power granted and power in question are
different. We have seen, historically, that the power to reconstruct a constitution and the power to
amend are different. As they are in common understanding, the power to repair a house is different
from the power to tear down and rebuild it. The
power in a legislature to amend an act of legislation
does not exclude the power to repeal the act and
make a new one. So the power in a government to
amend its constitution, as occasion may require,
does not exclude the power to reconstruct it anew,
as occasion may require. The meaning of language is
determined by usage. The usage of the provisions
and terms by the people of this country is certainly
uniform and fixed. The suggestion that we use them
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in a different sense in Rhode Island has no perceptible foundation. Indeed, it is hardly affirmed in the
report or opinion."
(cc) Jameson—P. 605:
"Because the people could not do the same
thing in a different way, it does not follow that
they could not do a different thing in a different way."
(dd) Jameson—P. 606:
"In the Massachusetts Convention of 1853, upon the question of the constitutionality of that
body, the Hon. Joel Parker, formerly chief justice of New Hampshire, then a professor at
the Cambridge Law School, said:—
'I believe this Convention to have been lawfully assembled . . . . Is not this mode of
amending the Constitution, which is prescribed in the Constitution in express terms,
perfectly consistent with the other mode, by
a Convention of delegates? There is no antagonism between the two modes. The people say by their Constitution, "We will have
a convenient mode by which this instrument
can be amended without a Convention; and
we will therefore embody a provision that
the opinion of two successive legislatures
that the Constitution ought to be amended,
shall be submitted to us for our action without the expense of a Convention." This is
all very well; but does it exclude the idea
t h a t a Convention may be holden where
there is nothing antagonistic between the
two modes? By no means.'
"Still more explicitly, in the same debate, he
said: 'I do not understand that there is anything in the terms of this provision of the Constitution which makes it exclusive, . . . . which
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makes it the sole and the only mode in which
the provisions of the Constitution are to be
amended. I do not understand the principle
to be that the mention of one mode excludes
all the other modes which would have existed
but for the mention of that mode. W h a t is the
principle upon this subject? I admit the principle in common law that the designation of
one person or one thing in some instances is
exclusion of all others; but does that principle
apply to this case? That principle applies to
all cases where, from the necessity or the nature of the case, it is shown to be the intent
that other things should be excluded.'
"In 1874 Mr. Charles O'Conor, the eminent
lawyer, at the instance of the New York Tribune, rendered an opinion touching the validity of certain amendments submitted to the
people of New York, in respect to which the
regularity of the legislative action had been
denied. In the course of his opinion, after
stating that concurrent resolutions of the legislative bodies in two different years, and a
final approval by the people, constituted the
process prescribed by the Constitution, Mr.
O'Conor said:—
'This instrument does not prohibit the employment of different means unless such a
negative can be implied from its having thus
made provision for a method which is undeniably convenient and suitable. I think it
is not maintainable by any f a i r reasoning
that a State Constitution which so provides
for its own amendment cannot be altered or varied from in any other manner.
Certainly such a negative implication is not
admissible in New York, for its present
State government came into being on pre-

cisely an opposite b a s i s ; ' t h a t is, was framed
by a Convention, for which no provision had
been made in the Constitution of 1821."

CONCLUSION
I t is submitted, therefore, that it would be a valid exercise
of the legislative power if the General Assembly should enact
legislation of the kind outlined in the request of His Excellency, the Governor.
Respectfully submitted,
J O H N P . HARTIGAN,

Attorney

General.

J O H N J . COONEY,

Second Assistant
Attorney General.
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FOREWORD
At the instance of the President of the Rhode Island Bar
Association, the undersigned agreed to undertake the
presentation of their views with reference to the Constitutional validity of a Convention properly summoned for the
purpose of revising or amending the Constitution of the
State of Rhode Island with a view to submitting the result
of the Convention's work to the people of the State of Rhode
Island for their approval or disapproval.
The undersigned have, at the suggestion of the President
of the Bar Association, taken what might be called, in the
light of the questions propounded by His Excellency, the
affirmative side; t h a t is, briefly stated, that the Legislature
as the agents and representatives of the sovereign power,
the people, may call a Constitutional Convention, so-called,
without infringing upon or acting in contravention of the
provisions of the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island
of 1842 or of the Constitution of the United States, it being
conclusively presumed herein that a Constitutional Con-
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vention, so-called, would not submit to the people for their
approval or rejection an instrument or pact inconsistent
with the provisions of Article IV, Sec. 4 of the Constitution of the United States.
In so doing, the undersigned earnestly hope that the contents of this memorandum, supplemented by oral argument,
will throw some light upon a momentous question, from the
standpoint of the people of the State of Rhode Island, and
prove of some assistance to the Honorable Court in the determination of the questions submitted.

Outline of Argument
In the presentation of the question, we urge the following
propositions:
I.

The Constitution of the State of Rhode Island may be
revised and altered by the people of this State in the exercise of their sovereign rights and privileges through the
medium of a Constitutional Convention.
II.
The General Assembly may by appropriate legislation
provide for the holding of a Constitutional Convention
and for the election at the instance of the Governor of
delegates to this Convention.
III.
The decision of the Supreme Court in "Opinion of the
Justices," 14 R. I. 649, affords no effectual bar to the
calling and holding of a Constitutional Convention for the
purpose of revising the existing Constitution and the submission of the Constitution so revised to the people for
their approval or disapproval.
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L
The Constitution of the State of Rhode Island may be
revised and altered by the people of this State in the exercise of their sovereign rights and privileges through the
medium of a Constitutional Convention.
Under a Republican form of government, the powers and
attributes of sovereignty are vested in the people. With
this fundamental principle, there can be no complaint and,
with the advocate urging it, there can be no controversy.
See Webster's Reply to Calhoun, and page 18 of Pamphlet
entitled "Changing the Constitutions
of the states, Especially Rhode Island " Perhaps the most outstanding recognition of this political axiom is found in the words familiar
to all embodied in the preamble of the Federal Constitution,
"We, the people of the United States," etc.
The well established powers and privileges that inhere in
the concept of sovereignty are usually described and regarded as inalienable and indefeasible; so commonplace
are these adjectives in describing these powers and privileges
t h a t a repetition of the statement seems trite and a citation
of sources and authorities with reference to the applicability
of these descriptive terms quite unnecessary.
They constitute, however, elemental as these remarks may
be, the premise, so important to the contention herein made,
that leads indisputably to the conclusion that the People of
this state may, at any time they so desire, revise the present
Constitution and adopt through orderly proceedings a new
Constitution to replace the existing one under which its
Government now functions.
The thought is well expressed in the following statement:
"Under our system of government, it is apparently
well settled that the ultimate sovereignty is in the
people # #
The power to change the funda-
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mental law—the written Constitution—is in them alone.
It is this principle which causes the Courts to recognize
generally the right of the Legislature as the organ of
the people to submit a call for a Convention of the
people and to regard such a Convention as a valid
method of Constitution making, although the existing
Constitution contains no provision to t h a t effect."
The Powers of Constitutional Conventions, see note,
29 Harvard Law Review, 528, 529.
The people themselves collectively and as a sovereign body
could undoubtedly, through orderly proceedings of their
own making, at any time adopt a Constitution to supersede the existing instrument. This method has never been
effectually used by the people although theoretically a revision could be accomplished in this manner. The obvious
demerit in such a method is the fact that such a body would
necessarily be unwieldy and not susceptible to orderly procedure. Consequently, Constitutions of the various states
of the Union have, from the earliest days of our political
history, been revised or amended through the only efficient
device that affords the most practical machinery for accomplishing the result, namely, the Constitutional Convention.
One of the greatest Constitutional lawyers in the history
of this country in his argument in Luther vs. Borden,
7 How. 1—a decision most apt in that it revolves about the
tumultuous times in which the present Constitution was
adopted—affirmed this fundamental principle in the course
of his presentation when he said:
"That of the old thirteen states, their Constitutions,
with but one exception, contained no provision for their
own amendment, yet there is hardly one that has not
altered its Constitution, and it has been done by Conventions called by the Legislature, as an ordinary exercise of power."

105
The quoted language is taken from Wood's
75 Pa. 59, infra.

Appeal,

From the dawn of our political history, the people have
exercised this sovereign privilege. Witness, for example,
the abrogation by the Constitutional Convention method of
the Articles of Confederation, despite the fact that it was
originally contemplated t h a t the covenant which resulted
in the formation of the first union of the thirteen original
states was to continue in perpetuity as evinced by the following excerpt from the Articles:
"And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every state and the Union shall be
perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time herea f t e r be made in any of them unless such alteration be
agreed to by a Congress of the United States and be
afterwards confirmed by the Legislature of every state."
Since that early day, Constitutional Conventions have
become the commonplace method of either revising in toto
or amending in p a r t the Constitutions of the various State
Governments.
Is there anything particularly unique that distinguishes
the present Rhode Island Constitution from the Constitutions of the many states t h a t have been revised and altered
through the media of Constitutional Conventions? Is the
form of government set up in 1842 so essentially and vitally
different from the others t h a t this Constitution cannot be
revised as distinguished from amended by popular action
and with popular approval in any manner t h a t the people
themselves desire so long as the result of their efforts and
the expression of their desires is not inconsistent with the
provisions of the Federal Constitution? Can it be that
the framers of the State Constitution have fettered the
people for all time, insofar as complete revision of the
Constitution is concerned? I t would seem, if precedent and
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analogy are of any significance in the determination of the
question, that those who urge that the Constitution of this
State cannot be revised or superseded by a new instrument,
but can be changed only by amendment through the machinery set forth in Article X I I I of the Constitution, have
taken a decidedly insecure position.
It is true, of course, that, like most of the early Constitutions, there is in the Rhode Island Constitution no provision
specifically covering the matter of a Constitutional Convention. The Pennsylvania Court, in one of the leading
cases on this subject, certainly one of the decisions most
frequently cited, after setting forth Mr. Webster's views,
supra, states, with reference to the accuracy and intrinsic
truth of the great statesman's observation:
"If this is true, and my own examination, so far as
with the limited time and opportunity since the argument of this case, I have been able to make it, has verified it, as well as shown the continuation of the same
practice to the present day, it would seem as though
the question as to whether the calling of a Constitutional Convention was a legal exercise of power by the
Legislature, should now be considered by all judicial
tribunals as settled so firmly as a part of the common
law of our Governments, that any attempt to disturb
it at this day would savor more of revolution than
legitimacy. He would be bold, indeed, who would now
assert that all these Conventions were usurpations, and
that all the Constitutions proposed by them and adopted
by the people were revolutionary."
Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. 59, 65; the quoted language is
from the lower court decision, affirmed on appeal in an
enlightening and very readable opinion of the Supreme
Court.
In Mr. Webster's statement, reference is made to the fact
that but one or possibly two of the original states had Constitutions containing provisions for their own amendment;
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it might be urged that of necessity, therefore, the Constitutional Convention afforded at that time the only machinery
for effecting a change. However, Jameson tells us as early
a s 1887 that on twenty-three different occasions Constitutional Conventions had been held in states whose Constitutions provided specifically for the legislative method of
amendment. He f u r t h e r states that at least six of these
Conventions were the subject of judicial scrutiny and the
action of each Convention was sustained by the Court before
which the question of its validity was argued; in the remaining instances the validity or legality of the Convention
method was never questioned.
See Hoar on Constitutional
Conventions, page 39, for a
list of the twenty-three Conventions to which the author
by a reference to Dodd, on "Revision of Constitutions"
adds
three more.
According to Hoar, in five of the cited cases, the relevant
Constitutions not only provided a method of amendment but
expressly stated that the latter method was to be the exclusive means of modifying or amending the instrument.
In this connection he mentions (p. 49) Delaware, Georgia
(on two occasions), Maryland and the United States.
Here it might be added parenthetically that Article X I I I
of the Rhode Island Constitution is patterned after a like
provision in the Michigan Constitution which was used by
many of the states as a precedent in connection with the
drafting of the provisions of the various Constitutions governing the matter of their amendment (Jameson, Sec. 395).
A t least it will be observed that there is a marked similarity
between the provisions of the various Constitutions adopted
or amended subsequent to the effective date of the Michigan
Constitution of 1835, insofar, certainly, as the provision is
concerned governing amendments to the various Constitutions themselves. Yet the presence of such a provision

108
(similar to Article X I I I ) seems to have afforded no obstacle
to the holding of Constitutional Conventions in several of
these states.
According to Mr. Hoar, on at least six occasions, Delaware
in 1851, Georgia in 1788, Indiana in 1850, Massachusetts
in 1820, Pennsylvania in 1789 and Nebraska in 1919, Constitutional Conventions have been called when and as the
people pleased in disregard of express Constitutional provisions for a different method of calling the Convention.
This statement appears in a signed but unpublished opinion
of the author written about ten years ago; the historical
data has not been verified but its accuracy has been accepted
because of the standing and reputation of the author.
I t would seem, therefore, from the standpoint of principle and precedent, t h a t the people may resort t o the
orderly procedure of a Constitutional Convention for the
purpose of revising an existing Constitution. The Supreme
Court of North Dakota has said t h a t
"the decided weight of authority and the more numerous
precedents are arrayed on the side of the doctrine which
supports the existence of this inherent Legislative power
to call a Constitutional Convention, notwithstanding the
fact that the instrument itself points out how it may be
amended."
State vs. Dahl, 6 N. D. 81, 87; 68 N. W. 418, 34
L. R. A. 97.
See also Bennett vs. Jackson, 186 Ind. 533; 116 N. E920, 922.
So long as the Constitution itself does not explicitly prohibit the holding of a Constitutional Convention, it would
seem now to be settled beyond peradventure t h a t the revision of a Constitution by this method constitutes the established rule. Dodd, "The Revision and Amendment of State
Constitutions " page 44.
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There is a serious question as a matter of sound theory
as distinguished from what might actually have been done
in practice, whether the people could not revise their Constitution through the machinery of a Constitutional Convention even though the instrument itself prohibited its
revision in this manner.
And this latter remark prompts the question, what legal,
constitutional, and substantial objection can be made in the
light of the explicit provisions of the Rhode Island Constitution to the holding of a Constitutional Convention called
for the express purpose of revising the present instrument?
The opening section of the Constitution contains a quotation from Washington's Farewell Address setting forth the
fundamental principle t h a t "the basis of our political systems is the right of the people to make and alter their Constitutions of Government," etc. This statement embodies in
it an acknowledgment of the sovereignty of the people and,
as a necessary corollary, an acknowledgment of their right
to make and modify their Constitutions. I t is certainly of
interest in connection with the construction of the statement t h a t it was made toward the close of his second term
and a t a time when Constitutional Conventions were the
standard mode, if not the only medium, of effecting changes
in State and Federal Constitutions. I t is certainly logical
to presume that he had in mind, when he used the word
"alter", the Constitutional Convention method. Under
these circumstances, the word "alter" should be construed
as though it connoted "revise" as distinguished from the
verb "amend" which is used exclusively in the form of a
noun, in Article X I I I of the Constitution with reference
to the subject of amendments.
Theoretically, those adopting the view that is opposed to
our own contention must urge—aside from the Opinion of
the Justices in 14 R. I., 649—that the people of the State
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of Rhode Island in 1842 surrendered or dedicated irrevocably to the State their inherent right to revise their
form of government. I t is impossible to believe that such a
dedication was made by implication, that a complete relinquishment of a sovereign right t h a t at the time was described
as inalienable was left to intendment.
In McCulloch vs. Maryland, Chief Justice MARSHALL, it
strikes us, answered such a contention when he said:
" I t has been said that the people had already surrendered all their powers to the State sovereignties and
had nothing more to give. But surely, the question
whether they may resume and modify the powers
granted to government does not remain to be settled
in this country."
McCulloch vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 404.
This fundamental view is very well expressed by Mr.
Justice WILSON, one of the framers of the Federal Constitution and also a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, where he says in his W o r k :
"Permit me to mention one great principle—the vital
principle I may well call it—which diffuses animation
and vigor through all the others. The principle I mean
is this: That the supreme or sovereign power of the
society resides in the citizens a t large; and that, therefore, they always retain the right of abolishing, altering or amending their Constitution, a t whatever time
and in whatever manner they shall deem expedient."
See quotation in Burke's Report, page 930, the quotation
from Mr. Justice Wilson's Work being taken from Wilson,
1 Works, page 17 (1790).
I t is idle to urge as a basis for denying the right of the
people of this state to hold a Constitutional Convention that
desired changes to the Constitution may be effected through
the medium of Article X I I I . Article X I I I contemplates the
passage only of "amendments" to the Constitution. Chief
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Justice Durfee contended that an entirely new Constitution
might be adopted under the machinery provided by Article
X I I I of the instrument. The authorities are, of course,
opposed to this view. See Power of the Legislature to call
a Constitutional Convention, 97 Central Law Journal, page
368, Note 1. See also Jameson, Sec. 538-540.
I t would serve no useful purpose to set forth judicial constructions or definitions of the word "amendment." I t was
used in our Constitution in what might be called the conventional sense. It refers merely and solely to incidental
changes in the instrument itself, even though such changes
might be of a momentous nature.
A new Constitution cannot be adopted by the procedure
outlined in Article X I I I of the Constitution itself and if
it is not permissible for the people of this state to effect
changes in the instrument revising it in toto, then the rights
of sovereignty may no longer be considered as vested in the
people of this state and it becomes anomalous and inaccurate
to describe these sovereign privileges as inalienable. In
the light of the authorities and in the light of precedent,
particularly precedents established in our sister Commonwealth after the decision hereinafter discussed in 6 Cushing,
573, was handed down, there would seem to be no basis for
the view t h a t a Constitutional Convention may not be called
for the purpose of revising the Constitution of this state;
and, if the General Assembly, acting for this especial purpose as the agents of a sovereign body, decide t h a t a Constitutional Convention is necessary and advisable in order
to alter and revise the Constitution of this State, and in
pursuance or execution of this decision, by appropriate
legislation, provide for the calling of such a Convention, it
is too late to contend t h a t such action is invalid or illegal
for whatever cause. See Jameson, Constitutional
Conventions, pages 210, 211.
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II.
The General Assembly may by appropriate legislation
provide for the holding of a Constitutional Convention
and for the election at the instance of the Governor of
delegates to this Convention.
At the outset, it should be borne in mind t h a t the
Legislature, in calling a Constitutional Convention, acts as
the agent of the people in so doing; in other words, it is
speaking for the ultimate sovereignty, the people. Jameson
states that this important function is exercised by the Legislature, as an historical matter, because in his language it
is particularly well fitted for the task. See Jameson,
Constitutional
Conventions, Section 121. There is, however, respectable authority for the view t h a t the Legislature
must first submit the question of the advisability of calling
a Constitutional Convention to the people for their approval or disapproval.
State vs. Dahl 6 N. P . 81 at 87, supra/ Hoar, Constitutional Conventions, page 73.
However, the opposing principle represents, it is submitted, the sounder view. There is certainly excellent
precedent in the history of this state for the proposition t h a t
the Legislature may call a Constitutional Convention without first obtaining popular approval of this proceeding.
The Constitution of 1842 was adopted in this very manner
(Acts and Resolves of 1842, J u n e Session, p. 3) and the
entire proceedings met with the unqualified approval of
Webster in connection with his argument in the case of
Luther vs. Borden, supra. It might be stated at this point
that in this case the defendants introduced in evidence the
entire proceedings under which the Rhode Island Constitutional Convention was called in 1842 and the instrument
itself as finally approved and adopted by the people. The
record, from the standpoint of the defendants, consists
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almost entirely of evidence of this character. Nowhere in
the arguments of either counsel or in the body of the decision itself is there the slightest intimation that the Constitutional Convention acted without authority in that the
people had not, prior to the holding of the Convention,
passed upon the advisability of calling and holding it. The
resourceful and scholarly counsel for the plaintiff would
have undoubtedly seized upon this fact, if the omission
were considered serious or vital. True it is that, until the
adoption of this Constitution, the state government was
functioning under its original charter. It is difficult to find
any logical basis for distinction in this fact. The state
government fundamentally, that is, from the standpoint of
the exercise of sovereign rights by the people, was the same
after 1789, or perhaps more accurately after 1776, as it is
today; this is particularly true in the light of the provisions
of Section 10 of Article IV of the present Constitution under
the language of which the General Assembly continued to
exercise after 1842 all of the powers that they had previously
exercised, except to the extent t h a t they were prohibited in
the Constitution, prior to the adoption of the present instrument. That various powers originally granted to the General Assembly under the charter still subsist to a very
marked degree in many important particulars is evident
from the recent decision of this Court in City of Providence
vs. Moulton, 52 R. I., 236; particularly relevant is the comment of the Court at pages 240, 241, seriatim, of the opinion.
See also Horton vs. City of Newport, 27 R. I., 283, 291.
The authorities hereinafter set forth indicate clearly that
the Legislature has the inherent right, in the absence of an
express constitutional prohibition, to call a Constitutional
Convention; its authority to do so is not dependent on any
enabling provisions in the original charter; but if the General Assembly must look to the charter for such power, then
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Section 10 of Article I V certainly clothes it with this
power.
Dodd seems to prefer, as a matter of expediency, the
prior submission to the people of the question of the advisability and desirability of calling a Constitutional Convention, but states unqualifiedly that the method to be
followed rests in the sound discretion of the Legislature;
in other words, compliance with such a provision is, in
effect, directory rather than mandatory.
See Dodd, The Revision and Amendment of State
Constitutions, pages 46-47.
Jameson discusses this matter at some length, and while
he speaks commendably of the practice of submitting the
question first to the people for action thereon, nevertheless,
expresses the thought that such action is by no means a
condition precedent to the valid calling of a Constitutional
Convention. This learned author speaks, it is submitted,
authoritatively on all questions having to do with the
amendment of State Constitutions through the medium of
Constitutional Conventions. Cooley says of his work, from
which we have so constantly cited:
"This work is so complete and satisfactory in its
treatment of the general subject as to leave little to
be said by one who shall afterwards attempt to cover
the same ground."
See Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
8th Edition, page 88, Note 1.
To revert, therefore, to the views of Mr. Jameson on this
important phase of the present question, we quote from his
work as follows:
" I t is too late to deny the right of a Legislature, in
the absence of express constitutional authority, to call
a convention, and in general impose upon it conditions
in relation to its organization, and to some extent, its
proceedings. Though doubtless considered irregular in
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its earlier stages, the usage has become established for
Legislatures to take the initiative in such cases, as of
course; and since the year 1820, when the New York
Council of Revision vetoed a Convention Bill because
the Legislature had passed it without providing for a
submission of it to the people, not as being beyond its
power, but as inexpedient, the power has very frequently been exercised."
See Jameson, page 389, quoted in 97 Central Law
Journal, supra, a t page 370.
F o r the opinion of the Council for the New York Revision,
see Jameson, Appendix F.
Earlier in the work (Section 123), the author states along
the same lines that the Conventions may be called under
two different situations: (1) where the Legislature calls
it and (2) where it merely recommends the calling of the
Convention to the people and withholds final action until
after popular approval or disapproval.
An examination of the New York decision or ruling will
indicate t h a t it was based only on matters of expediency
or perhaps out of practical considerations of economy. At
all events, the veto was not rendered on the ground that the
action was illegal in t h a t the Legislature failed in the first
instance to obtain "the sense of the people," but simply because such action, out of an abundance of caution, seemed
to be the prudent course to pursue.
In Wells vs. Bain, supra, 75 Pa. 39 a t 49, the Court, discussing the various methods of calling the Convention,
states:
"The form of the law is immaterial in this question
of derivative authority. I t may be an invitation in the
first place as was the act of 1789 under which the
Convention of 1790 was convened and an authority to
the people to meet in primary assemblies to select delegates and confer on them unrestricted powers, or it
may be a law to take the sense of the people on the
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question of calling a convention and then a law to make
the call and confer the powers the people intend to
confer upon their agents."
See also Power of Legislature to call a Constitutional Convention, 97 Central Law Journal
368-372 (1924).
On principle, it is obvious that there is no substantial
reason why the General Assembly cannot, of its own initiative, call a Constitutional Convention. If the legislation
were designed with a view to enabling the Convention to
act upon and adopt a Constitution with finality, that is,
without ultimate submission to the people, there would
obviously be a sound basis for serious complaint with the
method suggested. Such a procedure—although there
seems to be precedent for it—goes to the very brink of the
bounds that circumscribe the activities of legislative agents.
But, in the instant case, the calling of a Constitutional
Convention amounts in final analysis to nothing more nor
less than a formal or ministerial act. The only act of really
vital consequence is the final action taken by the people on
the matter of ratifying or repudiating the work of the Convention. This is the bulwark t h a t assures and guarantees
a truly republican form of Government and the adoption of
an instrument or Constitution that meets with popular approval. Compared with this, the mere calling of the Constitutional Convention, in an orderly fashion with proper
safeguards provided in the legislative act itself, is a relatively inconsequential act. I t would seem, therefore, that
both on principle and precedent, legal and factual, or historical, the General Assembly may properly call on its own
initiative a Constitutional Convention for the purpose of
revising the present Constitution.
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III.
The decision of the Supreme Court in "Opinion of the
Justices," 14 R. I. 649, affords no effectual bar to the
calling and holding of a Constitutional Convention for the
purpose of revising the existing Constitution and the submission of the Constitution so revised to the people for
their approved or disapproval.
The Opinion of the Justices handed down in 1883 is subject, from the standpoint of its reasoning and intrinsic logic,
to most serious criticism in t h a t it presumes that the people
of this state, a t the time of the adoption of the Constitution
of 1842, surrendered and ceded, by implication, for all time
their sovereign privilege of revising their Constitution. A
conclusion involving a complete surrender of such sovereign
principles should be based only upon express language
couched in unmistakable terms t h a t admitted of no other
construction.
From the standpoint of the opinion constituting a precedent binding on this Court, it might further be stated
that no such significance should be attached to the decision
because
(1) it is only advisory in character and in no jurisdiction
would it be regarded, because of this very fact, as affording
a binding precedent. F o r a discussion of this matter, see
"Constitution Making In Rhode Island" by Amasa M. Eaton,
Page X X I I , an excellent work on the general subject and
"Opinion on the calling of a Constitutional
Convention in
Rhode Island " pages 9 to 18, both pamphlets being available
in the State Law Library. See also "Memorandum on the
Legal Effect of Opinions given by Judges'' by J . B. Thayer,
Dean of Harvard Law School, in "Changing the Constitutions of the States, Especially Rhode Island "
(2) the decision is based on a misconception or at least a
misinterpretation of a similar decision in Massachusetts,
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viz., Opinion of the Justices, 6 Cush. 573. F o r a discussion
with reference to the unsoundness of the Massachusetts decision, see Jameson, Section 393-395. Incidentally, both the
decision of our own Court and the Massachusetts decision
are frequently referred to as being "generally discredited."
(3) the Court based its decision on the application of a
maxim that was completely irrelevant not merely because
of the fact that its application is confined almost exclusively
to contracts, deeds, etc., but primarily because of the fact
that the Legislature was not seeking to amend the Constitution through the medium of a Convention but rather to
revise it. Conceivably the maxim might have had some
application had the Legislature been seeking to amend the
Constitution rather than revise i t ; under these circumstances, it might well be said by the Court that the instrument having set forth an explicit method for accomplishing
the amendment, no other method was permissible, all other
methods having, by implication, been abrogated or revoked.
Were it possible to revise the Constitution under Article
X I I I , there might be some basis for the maxim's application
but a revision, as stated above, under Article X I I I is not
possible.
Jameson, Sections 538-540.
No particular deference seems to have been shown by
contemporaries of either state for the decisions. Justice
Morton, who was on the bench at the time that the decision
reported in 6 Cush. was handed down, later attended the
Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1853 and gave
to it his hearty support. The validity of the Convention's
action was staunchly defended by Honorable Joel Parker,
former Chief Justice of the State of New Hampshire. Such
eminent constitutional lawyers as Rufus Choate attended
this Convention and raised absolutely no question whatsoever as to its validity or essential legality.
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See Minority Report of the Joint Special Committee on
Constitutional
Changes made to the General
Assembly,
January Session, 1887, State Law Library.
See generally "The Assault on the
Constitution"
Providence Sunday Journal, February 3, 1935.
Both the Massachusetts and the Rhode Island decisions
were, considering the momentous character of the questions
involved, decided with the utmost haste. In the communication that presumably accompanied the Massachusetts decision, the Court said:
"We cannot close this communication without expressing our regret that questions of so much delicacy
and importance should be presented under circumstances which have given but a few hours for conferring
together and reducing our opinion to writing. Neither
of us had either examined or thought of the questions
until a f t e r the reference was made and it was not
until this day t h a t we were able to meet and consult
together on the subject."
Jameson, Sec. 393, p. 386.
The time given by the Massachusetts Court to the question was extremely brief as compared to the altogether too
brief period given to deliberation by our own Court.
The opinion is, therefore, no effective obstacle in the path
of a decision to the contrary by this Court. Its significance,
because of the fact t h a t the opinion is advisory in nature,
depends entirely on the reasoning and logic, or the absence
thereof, inherent in the decision itself. Anything more than
a most casual study and examination of the opinion compels
the conclusion that the reasoning of the Court and its conclusions are patently unsound.

General Conclusion
We have not endeavored to answer categorically the questions propounded by His Excellency, the Governor. We feel,
however, that with one exception, all questions are answered
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in the foregoing discussion covering the general subject matter of the functions of Constitutional Conventions and the
circumstances under which, and the methods by which, they
may be called by a legislative body. We desire, however,
without having given any especial thought to the matter
based upon extended research, to make at least passing
comment as to the eligibility of the general officers of the
State (question ( c ) ) to act as members of the Convention
solely by virtue of their incumbency.
Consistent with the thought hereinbefore set forth, it is
our opinion that all delegates to the Convention should be
elected by the people. For this reason, it is our offhand
opinion that the General Officers of the State should not,
merely by reason of the fact that they are now actual incumbents in office, be members of the Convention, a t least to the
extent of being eligible to vote on any controversial matter.
It might very well be, subject to the limitation that they
shall not be entitled to vote on a matter that is the subject
of controversy and in connection with which their votes
might result in the passage or defeat of the matter in dispute, that, ex officio, the Governor might preside at this Convention, the Secretary of State tabulate the votes and attend
to ministerial matters for which his office is especially fitted,
and the Attorney General assist the delegates in the solution
of any legal problems that might arise.
We desire, however, that the Honorable Court shall treat
this comment only in the nature of a suggestion, as we leave
the final determination of this particular question to the
sound discretion and judgment of the Honorable Court.
Respectfully submitted,
PATRICK

H.

WILLIAM A.
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MICHAEL D E CIANTIS

QUINN,
GRAHAM,
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S U P R E M E COURT

In

Re:

T H E R E Q U E S T OF T H E GOVERNOR FOR AN OPINION W I T H R E F E R E N C E TO T H E HOLDING OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.
SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDA FILED BY PATRICK H. QUINN, WILLIAM A. GRAHAM A N D MICHAEL DeCIANTIS IN ADDITION T O THEIR MAIN
BRIEF.
POINT "A"
The Constitution of Rhode Island in Express Terms
Clothes the General Assembly with the Power to Call
a Constitutional Convention.
ARGUMENT
Section 1, Article 1, of the Constitution of Rhode Island,
quoting Washington's language, declares the right of the
people to make and alter their constitutions of government.
The question therefore arises—how may said provision be
carried into effect? May all of the people assemble in some
super town meeting fashion to make such changes and alterations? As a practical proposition, such an assemblage is
quite out of the question. Indeed, it is hard to conceive that
procedure of t h a t kind would be a peaceful assembly.
The framers of the present constitution must have had in
mind a peaceful, practical and workable method of assembling the people to carry out the powers reserved to them in
Section 1 of Article 1. If they had it in mind, did they make

provision for it in tlie constitution? Counsel on this brief
think they did, in Section 1 of Article 4.
Article 3 of our State constitution distributes the powers
of the State government into three departments,—legislative, executive and judicial.
Article 4, Section 2, vests all legislative powers in the general assembly. Section 1 of said Article 4 reads as follows:
"This constitution shall be the supreme law of the state,
and any law inconsistent therewith shall be void. The
general assembly shall pass all laws necessary to carry
this constitution into effect"
What is a fair interpretation of the last fourteen words
of this section? Do they not clearly mean that the legislature not only "may", but "shall", provide the necessary machinery for carrying into effect every part of the constitution?
There is no express provision in the Rhode Island constitution which prohibits the general assembly from calling a
constitutional convention. Wherefore, the assembly's power
in that regard appears to be unlimited by reason of the
absence from the constitution of detailed provision whereby
the people can take advantage of and exercise the rights
given them under Section 1 of Article 1. The legislature is
the only body that can provide the finances necessary for the
holding of a constitutional convention.
In considering the power of the legislature, helpful language will be found in the decision of this Court in Providence vs. Moulton, 52 R. I. 236, especially commencing at
page 240.
At page 241 the Court calls attention to the fact that the
constitution defines the powers given to the executive and
judicial departments of the government, and that
"All other powers of government are given to the legislative department, unless prohibited in the constitution."
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If the legislature cannot act under Section 10 of Article
4, or Section 1 of Article 4, then Section 1 of Article 1 becomes obsolete and useless. We believe that the cases which
have been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States
under Section 4 of Article 4 of the United States Constitution are analogous to the case at bar. Section 4 of Article 4
of the United States Constitution guarantees to every state
a republican form of government, in the same manner in
which the Rhode Island constitution gives the people the
right to make or alter its constitutions. The federal constitution is silent as to how the foregoing section can be carried into effect—the same situation that we have in the
Rhode Island constitution. The courts, however, have decided that Congress may carry into effect Section 4 of
Article 4, and that the guarantee is primarily a legislative
power and it resides in the Congress. We contend that the
same theory applies in the case at bar. The power to carry
into effect Section 1 of Article 1 of our State constitution
resides in the legislature—not impliedly, but in express
terms under Section 1 of Article 4.
Texas vs. White, 7 Wall. 730.
Marshall vs. Dyer, 231 U. S. 250.
Mt. Timber Co. vs. Washington, 243 U. S. 219.
Pac. States Tel. Co. vs. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118.

A Pertinent Quotation from Mr. Cooley
At page 84 (Vol. 1, Eighth Edition) of his excellent work,
this distinguished constitutional authority uses the following language:
"II In the original States, and all other subsequently
admitted to the Union, the power to amend or revise
their constitutions resides in the great body of the
people as an organized body politic, who, being vested
with ultimate sovereignty, and the source of all State
authority, have power to control and alter at will the
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law which they have made. But the people, in the
legal sense, must be understood to be those who, by the
existing constitution, are clothed with political rights,
and who, while that instrument remains, will be the
sole organs through which the will of the body politic
can be expressed.
"III But the will of the people to this end can only
be expressed in the legitimate modes by which such a
body politic can act, and which must either be prescribed by the constitution whose revision or amendment is sought, or by an act of the legislative department of the State, which alone would be authorized to
speak for the people upon this subject, and to point
out a mode for the expression of their will in the
absence of any provision for amendment or revision
contained in the constitution itself."
Respectfully submitted,
PATRICK H .

QUINN_,

WILLIAM A.

GRAHAM,

MICHAEL

DECIANTIS,

As Amici

Curiae.

State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations

S u p r e m e Court

In Re: REQUEST OF HIS EXCELLENCY, THEODORE
FRANCIS GREEN, GOVERNOR O F T H E
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, FOR AN OPINION AS
TO THE VALIDITY OF LEGISLATION FOR
THE CALLING AND HOLDING OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.

BRIEF OF
THOMAS F. COONEY

State of R

Supreme Court
In Re: Request of His Excellency, Theodore Francis
Green, Governor of the State of Rhode Island and
Providence Plantations, for an Opinion as to the
Validity of Legislation for the Calling and Holding
of a Constitutional Convention.
BRIEF OF THOMAS F. COONEY

STATEMENT OF CASE
This brief, through the courtesy of the Court, is submitted
with reference to the proposition—

Have the General Assembly constitutional competency to enact a law authorizing the election of
delegates by the people to participate in a convention to revise the Constitution?
The writer submits they have such power.

ARGUMENT
(1) By way of preface to the consideration of the requests submitted to the Court by Governor Green, there is
an important inquiry to be determined here and now. Can
the Constitution be revised at this time in any other mode
than by a convention called for such purpose?
The Constitution is silent in regard to revision by means
of a convention. The significance of this omission is discussed elsewhere in this argument.
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Article XIII "Of Amendments":
"The general assembly may propose amendments to
this constitution by the votes of a majority of all the
members elected to each house. Such propositions for
amendment shall be published in the newspapers, and
printed copies of them shall be sent by the secretary of
state, with the names of all the members who shall have
voted thereon, with the yeas and nays, to all the town
and city clerks in the state. The said propositions shall
be, by said clerks, inserted in the warrants or notices
by them issued, for warning the next annual town and
ward meetings in April; and the clerks shall read said
propositions to the electors when thus assembled, with
the names of all the representatives and senators who
shall have voted thereon, with the yeas and nays, before
the election of senators and representatives shall be had.
If a majority of all the members elected to each house,
at said annual meeting, shall approve any proposition
thus made, the same shall be published and submitted
to the electors in the mode provided in the act of approval; and if then approved by three-fifths of the
electors of the state present and voting thereon in town
and ward meetings, it shall become a part of the constitution of the state."
By the adoption of Art. XI, Sec. 2, "Of Amendments", in
November 1900, the date of town and ward meetings was
transferred from the first Wednesday "in April" to "the
Tuesday after the first Monday in November
Sec. 12 of that
article annulled specifically several sections of Art. V I I of
the Constitution "elections"; Sec. 11 of Art. IV "of the legislative power" and of Art. III of the Constitution "and all
other provisions of the Constitution inconsistent
herewith
are hereby annulled"
Inasmuch as Sec. 2 of Art. XI "Of Amendments" changed
the date of town and ward meetings to "the Tuesday after
the first Monday of November
to that extent it is inconsistent with the provisions of Art. XIII of the Constitution
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"Of Amendments" which required proposals for amendment
to the Constitution to be submitted to the electors at "the
next annual meeting." That meeting was "in April." It was,
and is, annulled. It can not now be complied with.
Art. X V I "Of Amendments," adopted in November 1911,
provided for biennial elections "at town, ward and district
meetings on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November. Nine amendments have been adopted since the adoption of Art. X I "Of Amendments" in 1900. So far, I have
been unable to find any reference in any of them to an
amendment of Art. XIII of the Constitution which provided
explicitly that proposals for amendment were to be submitted to the electors at the town and ward meetings "in April".
It is to be noted that "if a majority of all the members
elected to each house, at said annual meeting shall approve
any proposition thus made, the same shall be published and
submitted to the electors in the mode provided in the act of
approval; if then approved by three-fifths of the electors of
the state present and voting thereon in town and ward meetings, it shall become a part of the Constitution of the State."
If, as is the fact, there can be no election in April there can,
therefore, be no "majority of all the members elected to each
house, at said annual meeting," to approve of a proposal to
amend the Constitution. It is to be observed that by the plain
terms of Art. X I I I each and all of the several steps stated
are to be carried out as conditions precedent before the proposal, shall become a part of the Constitution of the State.
This creates a void in the Constitution which renders impossible the adoption of specific amendments as was the practice prior to the adoption of Art, XI, Sec. 2 "Of Amendments". The omission for any reason to execute any of the
prescribed requirements of Art. XIII makes it legally impossible to adopt any specific amendment by that mode.
Where, then, is the matter of changing the Constitution
by specific amendment left? It appears that those entrusted
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with the duty of bringing the various articles of the Constitution into a harmonious whole have overlooked the indispensable substitute for the provisions of Art. XIII of the
Constitution which looked to town or ward meetings "in
April." It also required that a "majority of the members
elected to each house at said annual meeting should approve
any proposition thus made." Such a majority is not now obtainable.
By adoption of Sec. 2 of Art. XI, "Of Amendments," it has
become impossible to submit proposals of specific amendment
to the Constitution to town or ward meetings in April. It is
clear, therefore, that if the Constitution is to be revised, it
must be brought about through the act of a convention called
for that purpose and not otherwise.
All the authorities on the subject agree that if the Constitution contains no provision for its revision a convention for
such purpose is not only a legal mode, it is, in fact, the only
possible mode available at this time.
"And what's impossible, can't be,
And never, never comes to pass."
"In Re, Constitutional Convention," 14 R. I. 649, at 653:
"If our Constitution had no provision for amendment,
then, indeed, a power in the Assembly to call a convention or to initiate amendment in some other manner
might be implied 'ex necessitate'. The Assembly, under the charter, exercised such a power because the
charter had no such provision; though it is proper to
remark that under the charter the legislative power of
the Assembly was practically unlimited. Again, if the
provision for amendment was impracticable, there
might be, if no legal reason, yet some excuse for disregarding it."
It is apparent that since November 1900 it has been continuously impracticable to submit proposals of amendment
to the electors as prescribed in Art. XIII.
Chief Justice Durfee, in 14 R. I. 649, held that this was, or
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might, be a sufficient reason to warrant the calling of convention to revise the Constitution. A convention is, therefore, the only mode open at this time by which the people,
in the exercise of their "essential and unquestionable" sovereign right "to make and alter their constitutions of government" can revise their fundamental law in accordance with
the provisions of Art. I, Sec. 1:
"In the words of the Father of his Country, we declare
that 'the basis of our political systems is the right of the
people to make and alter their constitutions of government; but that the constitution which at any time
exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of
the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all'."
(2) "In limine" the Court is called upon to determine
the nature of the proposition under review.
Conceding that there is considerable authority to the contrary outside of this state, the writer submits that, viewed
in the light of the law first declared by the Court in the
trial of Thomas W. Dorr, at Newport, 1845, for treason,
Chief Justice Job Durfee, father of Chief Justice Thomas
Durfee, held the problem to be a political one.
"Courts take notice, without proof offered from the bar,
what the Constitution is or was and who is or was the
Governor of their own State. It belongs to the Legislature to exercise this high duty. It is the Legislature
which in the exercise of its delegated sovereignty counts
the votes and declares whether a constitution be adopted
or a Governor elected or not, and we can not revise or
reverse their acts in this particular, without usurping
their power. And why not? Because if we did so we
would cease to be a mere judicial, and become a political
tribunal, with the whole sovereignty in our hands, and,
neither the people nor the legislature would be sovereign; we should be sovereign, or you would be sovereign. Sovereignty is above courts and juries, and the
creature can not sit in judgment upon his creator."
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A scrutiny of the personnel of the convention which formulated the Constitution will disclose that he was a member
from Tiverton. Presumably, he was well informed of the
{towers and limitations of the instrument produced by him
and his associates.
The view expressed by Chief Justice Job Durfee in that
rase was confirmed by Chief Justice of the United States
Roger Brooke Taney, speaking for a unanimous court on the
point, in the leading case of Luther vs. Barden, 7 How. 1.
That case was an aftermath of the Dorr agitation which led
to the adoption of the Constitution.
"The political department has always determined
whether the proposed Constitution or the amendment
was ratified or not, by the people of the State; and the
judicial power has followed its decisions."
Referring to Rhode Island decisions, the Court in that case
said:
"But the Court uniformly held that the inquiry proposed to be made belonged to the political power, and
not to the judicial. That it rested with the political
power whether the charter government had been displaced or not; and when that decision was made, the
judicial department would be bound to take notice of
it as the paramount law of the State."
And again:
"If it (the Court) decides at all as a Court, it necessarily affirms the existence and authority of the government under which it is exercising a judicial power."
In White vs. Hart, 13 Wall. 646, a case which was heard
before the United States Supreme Court in which the validity
of the Constitution of the State of Georgia was denied, it
was held:
"The action of Congress upon the subject can not be
inquired into. This case is clearly one in which the
judicial is bound to follow the action of the political department of the government and is concluded by it."
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Judge Bradley's article develops the point that the pending
problem is political.
If such be the law in this jurisdiction, the duty of the Court
ends here. The question of whether or not a constitutional
convention may be held is to be determined exclusively by the
Assembly, the political arm of the state vested with such
power in Art. IV, Sec. 10, of the Constitution.
Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Ind. 336 Ann. Cases, 1915 C. That
case contains an exhaustive recital of authorities in support
of the view that the question involved here is judicial and
to be determined by this tribunal.
Dodd, "Revision of State Const.," p. 214, Ann. Cases, 1915
C, p. 200, cites Luther vs. Borden as contra. It speaks of
that case as one "which involved the episode in the history
of our country known as 'Dorr's Rebellion'." The important
feature is that it deals with the Constitution of Rhode
Island.
If the second contention of the writer is sound, the questions should be relegated to the General Assembly to arrange, in their discretion, to call a convention to revise the
Constitution.
(3) Assuming that the Court should hold that the questions are judicial to be determined by the Court, in view of
the fundamental and extremely delicate situation involved
here out of a due regard for a co-ordinate branch of the government, the Court should presume plenary power in the
Assembly.
The burden of proof beyond to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the unconstitutionality of such an act is upon
those who challenge the authority of the Assembly. "Under
the charter the legislative power was practically unlimited."
In re, Const. Con., 14 R. I. 649, at 653.
Fritz vs. Presbrey, 44 R. I. 207.
East Shore Land Co. vs. Peckham, 33 R. I. 341.
City of Providence vs. Moult on, 52 R. I. 236.
Miller vs. Clark, 47 R. I. 13.
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In the matter of Dorrance Street, 4 R. I. 230, at 240:
"There can be no doubt that an act of the general assembly not warranted by the constitutional powers vested
in that body, can not have the force of law, and that it
is the duty of this court, when properly called upon, so
to declare. Yet this is a high and important judicial
power, not to be exercised lightly, 'nor in any case,' to
borrow the language of a learned court, 'where it cannot
be made to appear plainly that the legislature have exceeded their powers.' It is always to be presumed, that
any act passed by the legislature is conformable to the
constitution, and has the force of law, until the contrary is clearly shown."
Taylor vs. Place, 4 R. I. at 345: "The question before us is,
substantially, whether, when in 1843, the people of this state
adopted a constitution, they" retained their ancient sovereign
right to "make and alter their constitutions of government"
by means of a convention called for that purpose by an act
of the General Assembly, Art. X I I I of the Constitution "Of
Amendments" to the contrary notwithstanding? In the
words of Judge Ames
"This can properly be ascertained only by attention to
the clauses of the constitution bearing upon this subject
by taking into view their origin and received construction when adopted, if they had any; and by the application to them of the usual rules of interpretation.
"These clauses are,"
ARTICLE I .

Declaration of Certain Constitutional Rights and Principles.
"In order effectually to secure the religious and political
freedom established by our venerated ancestors, and to preserve the same for our posterity, we do declare that the essential and unquestionable rights and principles hereinafter
mentioned shall be established, maintained and preserved,
and shall be of paramount obligation in all legislative, judicial, and executive proceedings."
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"Section 1. In the words of the Father of his Country,
we declare that 'the basis of our political systems is the right
of the people to make and alter their constitutions of government ; but that the constitution which at any time exists, till
changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people,
is sacredly obligatory upon all'."
"Art. IV, Sec. 10. The general assembly shall continue to
exercise the powers they have heretofore exercised, unless
prohibited in this constitution."
"Art. I, Sec. 23. The enumeration of the foregoing rights
shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by
the people."
*
* '
' '
Taylor vs. Place, at 347,—
"We have purposely arranged these clauses of the Constitution together, because they ail relate to the subject
under consideration, and must be viewed and construed
in their bearings upon each other, if we would arrive
at the result,—--their true meaning as a whole. Looking
at them in* this way, no on at all familiar with such
subjects and the established principles which govern
them, can, we think, fail to perceive the unity of design
and purpose manifested in them."
6 R. C. L., 51, Sec. 46:
"Existing Conditions and History.—It is settled by
very high authority that in placing a construction on a
constitution, or any clause or part thereof, a court
should look to the history of the times, and examine the
state of things existing when the constitution was
framed and adopted, in order to ascertain the old law,
the mischief and the remedy. Constitutions, like
statutes, are properly to be expounded in the light of
conditions existing at the time of their adoption, and
the general spirit of the times and the prevailing sentiments among the people. Reference may be made to the
historical facts relating to the original or political constitutions of the community and to prior well-known
practices and wages" Citing State vs. Narragansett, 16
R. I. 424, at 439;
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C. J. Durfee:
"The courts concede to state legislatures a legislative
power which is limited only by the Constitution, and
they are therefore careful not to declare a statute unconstitutional until they are clear that it is so. They
assume that the legislators, being bound by their oaths
to support the Constitution, consider, when any act is
proposed for passage, whether it can be constitutionally
passed, and do not vote for the passage of it until every
doubt has been quieted. In this view a becoming deference to the legislature inculcates caution. 'The question whether a law be void for its repugnancy to the
Constitution,' says Chief Justice Marshall, 'is at all
times a question of much delicacy, which ought seldom,
if ever, to be decided in the affirmative in a doubtful
case'. Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 128. The rule
generally laid down is, that statutes should be sustained
unless their unconstitutionality is clear beyond a reasonable doubt, A reasonable doubt, is to be resolved in
favor of the legislative action, and the act sustained.
Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 182 and cases
cited. Before an act is declared to be unconstitutional
it should clearly appear that it cannot be supported by
any reasonable intendment or allowable presumption.'
People vs. Supervisors of Orange, 17 N. Y. 235, 241. 'All
intendments favor constitutionality.' Crowley vs. State
of Oregon, 11 Oregon, 512. 'Courts will approach the
question with great caution, examine it in every possible
aspect, and ponder upon it as long as deliberation and
patient attention can throw any new light on the subject, and never declare a statute void unless the nullity
and invalidity of the act are placed, in their judgment,
beyond a reasonable doubt.' Wellington
et al., Petitioners, 16 Pick, 87, 95, per Shaw, C. J. 'It is but a decent, respect due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the
patriotism of the legislative body by which any law is
passed,' says Justice Washington, 'to presume in favor
of its validity, until its violation of the Constitution is
proved beyond all reasonable doubt.' Ogden vs. Saunders, 12 Wheat, 213, 270. Of course if courts are bound
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to be thus careful where a single statute involving a
doubt has been passed, it behooves them to be still more
careful, if possible, after several such statutes have been
passed from time to time by different legislatures, without either question or protest. A long continued legislative construction is entitled to great weight with the
courts, if not clearly erroneous."
The writer has purposely quoted the author of the advisory
opinion "In Re, Constitutional Convention," 14. R. I. 649, at
length in order to emphasize the point that, if he had considered the requests submitted to the Court in that case by the
Senate in the light of the authorities he quoted, and had applied to them the rules which he stated in 16 R. I. 424, it is
quite in order to presume that this court would not have been
called upon to answer the requests presented here by Governor Green. "Quod erat demonstrandum."
This is the more obvious when it is borne in mind that, as
the author of 14 R. I. in "Some Thoughts on the Constitution," issued in reply to the article of Judge Bradley in criticism of 14 R. I., made it clear that when he wrote the opinion
in 14 R. I., he knew of the passage of two acts in the Assembly
of 1853 which allowed electors to determine whether or not
they desired to have a convention called to revise the Constitution.
He not only did not undertake in 14 R. I. to distinguish
those laws from the questions submitted by the Senate in
that case, he ignored all mention of them. No explanation of
the silence on the point in 14 R. I. is offered in "Some
Thoughts on the Constitution" wherein they are dealt upon
with much detail.
It affords a striking illustration of—
"Incidis in Scyllam cupiens vitare Charybdim."
"You fell upon Scylla, desiring to avoid Charybdis."
If there is no essential difference in regard to those
laws (and Judge Durfee's omission to say so leads directly to
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such a conclusion) and the requests submitted by the Senate
in 14 R. I. in arriving at the conclusion set out therein, he
fell upon Scylla in desiring to avoid Charybdis; i. e., the acts
of May and October 1853.
(4) One of the controlling considerations, if not the controlling consideration, arising out of this proceeding has to
do with the extent of legislative power applicable under the
Constitution as expressed in Art. IV, Sec. 10, which declares
that "The general assembly shall continue to exercise the
powers they have heretofore exercised, unless prohibited in
this constitution "
Chief Justice Ames, in Taylor vs. Place, at 360, declared:
"This last clause, it will be observed, is mandatory upon
the assembly to exercise the powers they have heretofore exercised, unless prohibited; and it is manifest,
that of these customary powers, the exercise of which
they are commanded to continue, * * *."
(5) The Court will observe that in this case certain words
are set out in italics, the obvious purpose of which is to give
added emphasis to the mandatory obligation of the Assembly
to continue to exercise such powers after the adoption of the
Constitution.
With this mandatory duty imposed upon the
Assembly of 1935 to continue to exercise the vast legal powers with which they are vested under Art. IV, Sec. 10, are
they prohibited from issuing a call for a convention at this
time?
That the Assembly of 1853 believed it to be not only their
right but their duty to continue to exercise the powers exercised by their predecessors under the charter is apparent by
the passage of the acts of May and October in 1853.
In State vs. Narragansett, Judge Durfee, at p. 440, stressed
the force of such conduct:
"A long continued legislative construction is entitled to
great weight by the Courts, if not clearly erroneous."
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In 14 R. I., the court, although informed of those laws,
did not hold the construction placed upon their powers
by the Assembly in 1853 was clearly erroneous. If not erroneous in 1853, why should an attempt to exercise such power in
1935 be held to be clearly erroneous? The Assembly have
all the power at this time their predecessors of 1853 had.
If it was constitutional for them to issue two calls for conventions in 1853, why is it unconstitutional for their successors in 1935 to follow their example? There has been no
limitation imposed upon the present Assembly which did
not operate upon that of 1853.
(6) It is impossible to distinguish between the degrees
of power granted to the several Assemblies. At least, no
one has undertaken to point to such difference if it exists.
The Court, in 14 R. I., did not do so nor did the author of
"Some Thoughts on the Constitution" when discussing them.
(7) Whence originates the supposed bar to the Assembly of 1935 as it is phrased in 14 R. I. 649, at 650,
"to call upon the electors to elect members to constitute
a convention to frame a new Constitution of the State"?
In Burke's Report (1844), an exhaustive review of
the Dorrite controversy of 1842, there is contained a statement of the "Peoples' Constitution," (This was a Dorrite
production.) ; The "Landholders' Constitution" which was
rejected by the electors and the present organic law. In each
of the earlier documents may be found the language set out
in Art. X I I I "Of Amendments". "The general assembly may
propose
amendments
On p. 11 of the "Journal of the Convention" of 1842 there
is to be found a single line in regard to the adoption of that
article. "Article X I I I was taken up and after some discussion was adopted."
(8) From the time of Roger Williams, 1636-1683, down
to March 30th, 1883, a period of two and a half centuries, less
three years, in so far as a somewhat extended search for an-
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thority on the subject is concerned, the writer has been unable to locate anything which even remotely questions the
power of the Assembly, despite Art. XIII, to call a convention to revise the Constitution. In the meantime the Assembly had enacted four such laws before 1842 and two in 1853.
The omission by everyone, so far as is known, for 247 years
to question the power of the Assembly to do this develops
such a general acceptance of power in our "venerated ancestors" as to reach demonstrative proof of its possession by
the present Assembly, 14 R. I. 649 to the contrary notwithstanding.
6 R. C. L., pp. 62 and 65,
Sec. 59, 60 and 61, at p. 64.
(9) The suppositions bar to the Assembly of 1935 issuing a call for the choice of delegates to a convention to revise
the Constitution is assumed to be found in 14 R. I. 649 in
an advisory opinion in which the Court answered
questions
it was not asked. What the Senate wanted to know was did
the Assembly have the—
( I ) "legal competency—to call upon the electors to
elect members to constitute a convention to frame
a new Constitution of the State."
(II)

"as to whether it is legally competent for the
General Assembly to submit to the qualified electors the question whether the said electors will
call a convention to frame a new
Constitution
(10) Nowhere in either of the inquiries addressed to the
Court does the term "amendment" appear. It was unnecessary for the Senate to seek information from the Court in
regard to the legal competency of the General Assembly to
"propose amendments to this constitution
They had plenary power to do that under Art. XIII.
In
a word, the Senate "asked for bread and they were given a
stone." There does not seem to be any essential difference between not answering at all and responding to an inquiry

141
which was not propounded. The record in 14 R. I. 649 is an
illustration of "Res ipsa loquitur" on the point.
(11) The opinion in 14 R. I. was but advisory. Such
opinions under the well settled law of Rhode Island "have
no weight as precedents."
Taylor vs. Place, 302.
(12) Their inherent weakness is disclosed in Allen vs.
Danielson, 15 R. I. 480. In that case the court overruled its
advisory opinion in Knowles vs. Petitioner, 13 R. I. 90, saying, p. 482:
"But we have no doubt that we should have decided the
case differently, if we had before us when we decided it,
the same array of authorities which we have before us
now. The question then is, shall we adhere to it out of
regard for the maxim 'stare decisis,' or shall we adopt
what we now consider the sounder rule? We have come
to the conclusion that, considering how recently the
case was decided, very little harm will come from overruling it, and that by doing so we shall not only establish the correct rule, but also, which is no inconsiderable
gain, establish the rule which is generally prevalent elsewhere."
It is difficult, perhaps, impossible to suggest language
more apposite in the proceeding before the Court.
(13) One of the patent weaknesses in 14 R. I., already
referred to, is stated by its author as follows, on p. 655:
"The questions are extremely important, and we should
have been glad of an opportunity to give them a more
careful study, but under the request of the Senate for
our opinion, 'without any unnecessary delay,' * * *."
The record shows that the request by the Senate was received "on March 2ith inst." March 2Uh 1883 was Saturday.
Presumably there was not much opportunity to bring the
matter to the attention of all the members of the court on
that day. March 25th 1883 was Sunday. It is not reasonable
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to suggest that anything was done about it that day. If the
Court sat at hearings on Monday, Wednesday and Friday
of the week commencing March 26th 1883 it would not be at
all likely that the inquiries were exhaustively considered on
any of those dates. There is nothing that the writer has seen
to indicate the hour on Friday, March 30th 1883, when the
opinion was handed down. Why the haste? Judge Bradley
offers an explanation.
(14) The apology given for the unusual haste exemplified in the case; viz., "without unnecessary delay," said nothing more than is implied in the present proceeding. The requests of Governor Green do not use language such as is
found in 14 R. I. Notwithstanding such omission, the Court,
out of due regard for the Chief Executive of the State, and
having in mind the importance of his inquiries, will answer
"without unnecessary delay."
Judge Bradley, in his article, discusses that feature of the
case. It is to be weighed by what was said of it by one who
ought to know a great deal about it.
Charles I of England said, "Never make a defence or
apology before you are accused." The criticism of 14 R. I.
by Judge Bradley suggests Milton in "Paradise Lost":
"In her face excuse
Came prologue, and apology too prompt."
(15) 14 R. I. at 651 states as its reason for the opinion
"Expressio unius est exclusio alterius." As pointed out by
Judge Bradley, that maxim does not apply where there is
another mode implicitly stated. That there is such another
mode of revising the Constitution is clearly implied in Art. I,
Sec. 1. The Constitution is unquestionably postulated upon
the indestructible, unalienable sovereign right of the people
"to make and alter their Constitutions of government" in
such mode as our "venerated ancestors" did when they
drafted the Constitution in 1842.
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It was and is one of the rights retained by them and is
vouchsafed to us of this generation, and we, in turn, are the
trustees of it for our successors as electors by Sec. 23 of
Art. L
(16)
port.

Rawle on the Const., p. 17, quoted in Burke's Re-

The members of the convention that met at Newport
and East Greenwich in June and November of 1842 were not
empowered to minimize in the least that sovereign right, the
exercise of which by them and their fellow citizens of that
period was the sole warrant for their presence in that convention. Neither can it be claimed with any show of reason
that the electors who adopted their work by taking part in
the referendum on the subject, expressly or impliedly, prohibited themselves or their successors from holding another
convention if and when they desired it. Nothing short of
the most positive language amounting to proof to a moral
certainty is sufficient to prohibit them if it be assumed that
they had an antecedent sovereign right to do so.
(17) The Court, in 14 R. I. at 654, referred to Taylor vs.
Place as authority for the cogency of the maxim, "Expressio
unius." Reference to that case at p. 358 shows that it is
subject to a controlling qualification which was omitted in
14 R. I.; viz., "The court may imply negative from affirmative words, where the implication promotes, not where it defeats the intention "
Rawle, as shown in Burke's Report, holds that such power
was unalienable by the convention.
(18) The writer of the opinion in 14 R. I. in "Some
Thoughts on the Constitution" virtually concedes its unsoundness in his admission that, if the convention of 1842
had adopted the declaration of rights submitted by Mr.
Ennis, of Newport, he would find it difficult to maintain Art.
X I I I as the exclusive mode of revising the Constitution.
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The Journal of the Convention, p. 7, shows that declaration to be:
"All political power and sovereignty are originally
vested in and of right belong to the people. All free
governments are founded in and their authority are
established for the greater good of the whole number.
The people have, therefore, an unalienable and indefeasible right in their original sovereign and unlimited
capacity to alter, reform and change the same whenever
their safety or happiness requires it."
A contrast of Art. I, Sec. 1, with the foregoing does not
disclose any essential difference. At least there is no such
distinction between them which justifies the interpretation
given in 14 R. I.
A comparison of the Ennis statement with Art. I, Sec. 1,
demonstrates that, if there is no difference in substance, the
opinion in 14 R. I. is untenable here. This is virtually admitted in "Some Thoughts," etc. Delegate Ennis said nothing more than what is taken for granted in the present declaration of rights. It states that, "the essential and unquestionable rights", etc.
In Sec. 1, Art. I, the framers by a complimentary reference
to "the Father of His Country" simply predicated their assertion on their sovereign rights implied in the preceding
paragraph. The unsoundness of the premises being established, the erroneous conclusion inevitable therefrom is to be
disregarded.
Rawle on the Const., p. 17, quoted in Burke's Report.
(19) It is but an obvious truism to assert that the implication of a negative applied to the unalienable sovereign
right of the people to alter their constitution in a case where
the language is restricted to their
servants—Assembly—by
the permissive phrase "The general assembly may propose
amendments to their Constitution" is absolutely destructive
of that which the "Declaration of Certain Constitutional
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Rights and Principles," declares to be "essential and unquestionable" and "shall be established, maintained and preserved, and shall be of paramount obligation in all legislative, judicial and executive proceedings."
It seems like "carrying coals to Newcastle" to elaborate
upon the proposition that "exclusio unius" is wholly inapplicable to the sovereign right of the people to revise their
Constitution by a convention.
6 Am. and Eng. Enc., 2d ed., p. 902.
Nunnemacher vs. State, 127 Wis. 190.
Judge Bradley, p. 28-38 to 104.
6 R. C. L. p. 49, Sec. 43 and 44.
Cooley's Cons. Lim., 8th ed.. p. 85.
Quoting Jameson:
"N or is it true—that by the giving to the Legislature, in
a Constitution express power to recommend specific
amendments, involves by implication the denial to that
body of power to call conventions for general revisions."
State vs. Dahl, 9 N. D. 81, at 86:
"Nor is it true, as intimated by the judges in the opinion,
that the giving to the Legislature in a Constitution express power to recommend specific amendments to a
constitution involves by implication, the denial to that
body of power to call conventions for a general revision
of it. We shall see in a subsequent part of this work
that such a grant is applicable only to disconnected and
unimportant amendments.
It is obvious that a grant of
power to propose such amendments in a summary manner and without the formalities attending the enactment
of fundamental laws can not be considered as an implied
prohibition to effect a general revision."
"And even when the only method provided in the Constitution for its own modification is by legislative submission of amendments, the better doctrine seems to be
that such provision, unless in terms restrictive, is permissive only, and does not preclude the calling of a con-
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stitutional convention under the implied powers of the
legislative department."
Ellingham vs. Dye Ann. Cases, 1915 C, 218.
"Rawle on Constitution, p. 17:
"But the best constitution which can be framed with
the most anxious deliberation that can be bestowed
upon it may, in practice, be found imperfect and inadequate to the true interests of society. Alterations and
amendments then become desirable. The people retain
—the people can not perhaps, divest themselves of the
power to make such
alterations"
(20) 14 R. I. at 652 cites, "Chief Justice Shaw was of
the same way of thinking," 6 Cush. 573. An examination of
that case shows that the questions answered there are unlike
those in 14 R. I.
Roger Sherman Hoar, p. 46.
As pointed out by Judge Bradley, the electors of Massachusetts held a convention in 1853 to revise their organic law
despite 6 Cush. He quotes from a number of eminent jurists who took part in it. No question of its unconstitutionality was suggested. The author of 14 R. I. does not refer to
this assemblage although it took place twenty years after
the opinion in 6 Cush. was written.
In 1917 another convention was held in Massachusetts.
Its constitutionality was expressly upheld in Loring vs.
Young, 239 Mass. 350.
Mr. Hoar, in his work, holds that our Court erred in citing
6 Cush. in support of its position. Mr. Atwill, former Attorney General of Massachusetts, is quoted by Mr. Hoar as
holding that both the convention and specific
amendment
modes are available to the people as they choose. The present attitude of Massachusetts strongly supports the sovereign right of the electors of Rhode Island to have a convention called.
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Hoar. p. 46. "Modern Interpretations", etc,:
"It was assumed in the opinion ( R . I . ) that the
opinion applies to the existing constitutional laws of
the Commonwealth and the rights and powers retained
from and under them, and did not depend upon the
natural right of the people in cases of great emergency,
or upon the obvious failure of their existing Constitution to accomplish the objects for which it was designed,
to provide for the management and alteration of their
fundamental laws.
"It was contended that there was precedent for this
opinion (L e„ the Rhode Island one) in an earlier
opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. A
careful study of the opinion of the Massachusetts Court,
however, shows that its opinion related to another matter. Citing Holcombe. 'State Government*, p. 95, bottom of p. 47. Hoar: "'The Rhode Island Court, even has
recognized the right to hold unauthorized conventions
'ex necessitate,'
See opinion of Attorney General Atwill of Massachusetts. with reference to conventions in that state:
'This incontestable, unalienable, and indefeasible
right, which indeed is the essence of a Republican form of government, can not, in my judgment, be
taken away except by plain and unmistakable language.
That the people of one generation can deprive the people of a succeeding generation of their inalienable right
to reform, alter, or totally change their form of government, except in a restricted manner, when their protection. safety, prosperity, and happiness require it is repugnant to our theory of government. That the right
to govern depends upon the consent of the governed.
It seems to me a much more reasonable, if not a necessary construction of the Constitution to hold that Art,
IX "Of Amendments" provides only a manner of amending the Constitution in addition to other methods that
may be adopted by the people of changing their form of
government under the fundamental right granted by
the people of rights, whenever 'their protection, safety,
prosperity, and happiness require it.* Accordingly. I
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am of the opinion that the convention will be held under the authority of the Commonwealth."
(21) By substituting Art. XIII of the Constitution of
Rhode Island for Art. IX of the Constitution of Massachusetts, the opinion of Attorney General Atwill should be controlling on the questions submitted to the Court in this proceeding.
As pointed out by him, the electors have a choice of two
methods. The particular mode to be chosen depends upon
the extent of the revision proposed e. g. It would be unwise
to call a convention for amendments Nos. I, II, III, V, VI,
VIII, IX and X. Our "venerated ancestors" deemed it
necessary to call a convention to adjust the suffrage problem
in 1842. Under the charter they could have passed a specific
law amending it, if they desired to do so. 14 R. I. 653.
(22) The present far-reaching political problems, insoluble except by a convention, furnish proof of the truth of
the opinion of Mr. Atwill in regard to the right of the people
to hold it.
Thomas Jefferson:
"It is not only the right, but the duty of those now on
the stage of action, to change the laws and institutions
of government, keep pace with the progress of knowledge, the light of science, and the amelioration of the
condition of society. Nothing is to be considered unchangeable, but the inherent and inalienable rights of
man."
John Marshall, Chief Justice of the United States:
"It has been said that the people had already surrendered all their power to the state sovereignties and
had nothing more to give. But, surely the question
whether they may resume and modify the powers
granted the government does not remain to be settled
in this country."
4 Wheat. 405.
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James Wilson, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, a member of the convention of 1787 which framed the
Constitution of the United States, and afterwards a judge of
the Supreme Court of the United States, "Lectures on Law,"
Vol. I, p. 17. Works VIII, p. 292.
(23) These quotations are to be considered with relation
to Sec. 23 of Art. I : "The enumeration of the foregoing
rights shall not be construed to impair or deny other rights
retained by the people."
The right to revise the Constitution by means of a convention instead of specific amendments is one of "the rights
retained by the people
They exercised it before and since
the adoption of the Constitution. If it is unalienable, the
members of the convention were powerless to destroy or impair it. They did not attempt to do so. Whence, then, is
the authority for anyone but the people in the exercise of
their sovereign power to abridge it? Mr. Atwill pointed out
that Art. X I I I does not furnish the authority. That is but
one mode of changing the Constitution. The other is still
operative. It was overlooked, or ignored, in 14 R. I. The
opinion of Mr. Atwill, quoted on page 20 of this argument,
renders further discussion as to the unsoundness of that pronouncement a work of supererogation.
(24) In concluding the writers analysis of 14 R. I. 649,
he would call the court's attention to the language of the
first paragraph on p. 654. beginning with the words,
"Any new constitution, therefore, which a convention
would form, would be a new constitution only in name,
but would be in fact our present constitution amended.
It is impossible for us to imagine any alteration, consistent with a republican form of government, which can
not be effected by specific amendment as provided in the
constitution."
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The mental attitude reflected by this language renders
pertinent the statement of the Court in Carr vs. American
Locomotive Co., 31 R. I. 234, p. 242 :
"This position presupposes in the judicial mind an infallibility in the determination of conflicting issues of
fact (dealing with the sovereign right of the people)
which few courts would claim for themselves."
It presupposes an absolute inerrancy of prophecy not often
found in judicial proceedings. Ponte vs. Marconi, 27 R. I. 1,
at 8:
"No doubt but ye are the people, and wisdom shall die
with you."
It cannot make the slightest difference in such a proceeding
as this whether it was or was not impossible for the Court
to imagine anything with reference to the right of the people
to change their Constitution.
In March 1883 it was impossible for the average person
to imagine himself sitting in his home listening to a short
wave broadcast by radio of a musical concert from Berlin,
London, or South Africa. It was equally beyond the range
of one's imagination to visualize long distance telephonic
communication, submarine transportation, transcontinental
aeroplane trips from New York to San Francisco in less than
twelve hours. It was impossible for the so-called learned
men up to the first third of the seventeenth century to imagine the mobility of the earth. It was not until Galilei
proved it that they were willing to think it possible.
They forced a recantation of his opinion. As he arose
from his knees, he is supposed to have said, "E pur si mouve."
"And yet it moves." These are now commonplace facts, indicating that scientific matters have advanced far beyond
the imagination of those who lived in 1883. Why is it not
equally axiomatic that, in the field of political science the
statement of Galilei is pertinent, "And yet it moves"?
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It is to take advantage of this changed condition in the
realm of civil government that the people, by an overwhelming demand, in the recent election requested that they be
enabled to exercise the unquestionable right to alter their
Constitution, in convention, despite the advisory opinion in
14 R. I. 649, which is an exemplification of "parens patriae",
untenable under our system of government.
(25) The view expressed "In Re, Constitutional Convention," 14 R. I., is contrary to all the authorities that have
discussed the subject. Dodd, "Revision and Amendment of
State Constitutions" p. 45:
"As has been said above, the Rhode Island opinion is
contrary to the uniform practice of the states."
At bottom of p. 47, that author gives a list of instances
where there were no provisions for conventions to be found
in the constitutions of those states. Nevertheless, they were
held. See pp. 66 and 118. Introductory statement of Hon.
William P. Sheffield, Sr., in an article written in reply to
the views of Judge Bradley and Abraham A. Payne; Roger
Sherman Hoar, pp. 9 and 48; Cooley Cons. Lim. 7th ed., p.
56; Dodd, p. 120;
"As already suggested in an earlier chapter, the convention system has been adopted almost as extensively, and
although twelve of the State Constitutions now in force
make no specific provisions for conventions, yet in a
number of these states conventions have been held, and
Rhode Island is the only one of them in which the view is
officially declared against the holding of a convention. It
may, therefore, be said that New Hampshire is the only
state in which amendments may not be proposed by the
Legislature, and Rhode Island is perhaps the only exception to the rule that conventions may be held for the
revising of State Constitutions."
(26) Prof. J. Q. Dealey, former member of the faculty of
Brown University, "American State Constitutions," makes
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a vital distinction which is important to bear in mind
throughout. He points out that "amendments", found in
Art. XIII, as that term was understood when the Constitution was adopted in 1843, is entirely dissimilar from "convention" which was the mode used in formulating it.
The Court, in 14 R. I., at 653 rcognized the distinction
emphasized by Prof. Dealey:
"Power in the assembly to call a convention or to initiate
amendments in some other manner might be implied 'ex
necessitate'."
Later in the opinion, however, it seemed to confuse them as
meaning the same thing:
"any act of the assembly providing for a convention to
amend the Constitution is unconstitutional and void."
(27) "Nihil simile idem." "Nothing similar is the
same." There is no similarity, and, of course, no sameness,
between "amendments" and "convention" as those terms are
understood in constitutional law. The application of the
rule "expressio unius" in regard to amendments can not reasonably be extended to comprehend conventions unless it is
not only the same thing but also that it is stated so unequivocally that there can be no misunderstanding about it. Art.
XIII does not use such language. It is no where to be found
in the Constitution. It is this confusion of the term "amendments" with "conventions" which has to do with the right of
the people as distinguished from the Assembly that has given
rise to the erroneous conclusion held in 14 R. I. 649.
Prof. Dealey, in his work, "Political Situation in Rhode
Island," bottom p. 44:
"By all American precedents the Assembly has the power
to call a convention or to refer the matter to the voters
for decision."
In speaking of the view expressed in 14 R. I., he said:
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"The opinion is clung to by party leaders merely as a
subterfuge to escape the revision of the Constitution,
(p. 45.) Why not then, call a convention consisting of
small membership, elected from equally popular districts, with power unlimited except by national constitution and referring its distinctions directly to the electors for approval or rejection?"
(28) Section 1 of the act of the Assembly passed at the
June session, 1842, which called the convention which
adopted the present Constitution, provides that the delegates—
"may frame a new Constitution for this state either in
whole or in part, with full powers for that purpose
That same power exists today.
(29) The centuries old tradition of the sovereign, indefeasible right of the people to hold such a convention in 1935
called by the General Assembly is reflected in the resolution
passed, May 29, 1790, in ratification of the Federal Constitution :
II "That all power is naturally vested in, and consequently derived from the people; that magistrates,
therefore, are their trustees and changes are at all
times amenable to them."
I l l "That the powers of government may be re-assumed
by the people, whensoever it shall become necessary
to their happiness."
It was in an atmosphere developed by and from the recognition of these principles that the convention of 1842 was
held.
(30) Attached to this argument is a list of the names of
the delegates to the convention in 1842. Among them were
men who later became Chief Justices of this Court:—Job
Durfee, George A. Brayton—and Associate Justices Potter
and Shearman, William P. Sheffield, Sr., and others equally
prominent in the legal, political, and social life of the State.
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These men were deeply learned in the distinctive Rhode
Island view of sovereignty being an unalienable right in the
people.
No one knew it better than they. As stated by Chief Justice Bradley, if it was intended to deprive the future generations of electors of the sovereign right which had been
exercised by and for themselves and their predecessors unquestioned for centuries, they would have said so in language
which was unmistakable to that end.
The omission to do so on the part of such men is
a demonstration that they conceded the right to revise the
Constitution by convention as an almost sacred one which,
as trustees, they did not undertake to minimize, not to
speak of prohibiting its free and unrestricted use to those
who were to come after them. Those men did not pretend
to be omniscient or infallible. They knew that their work
was likely to prove imperfect in some respect in the future.
They also knew it was not like "the laws of the Medes and
Persians which altereth not," They likewise knew, in the
words of Pope:
"Whoever thinks a faultless piece to see,
Thinks what ne'er was, nor is, nor shall be."
They presumed that their successors would be as intelligent and as conscientious as they were in solving the civic
problems that were bound to arise after they had departed
from this earth. They left for us the same measure and
quality of right which they exercised for themselves and as
trustees for their fellow-citizens.
(31) No one at all familiar with the history of the State
can have any doubt as to the tenacity of our people in regard
to their right to revise the Constitution in convention being
reserved to them by Art. I, Sec. 1 and 23 of the Constitution.
This distinctive Rhode Island concept of sovereignty was
ably and eloquently limned by Mr. Justice Capotosto when,
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acting as Assistant Attorney General of the State, in the
case of State of Rhode Island vs. Palmer, before the Supreme
Court of the United States, he discussed the 18th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States from the
Rhode Island viewpoint.
Burke's Report on the Dorr controversy contains an exhaustive citation of authority in support of the view held by
the writer.
(32) The authorities quoted by Judge Bradley in his
article show that, in Rhode Island, the questions submitted
are political and, therefore, are not to be passed upon by the
Court. Hoar, pp. 162 and 163, especially at 164, has to say:
"On the whole it may be said that the Courts have no
power to interfere with convention proceedings relative
to framing of the constitution and will probably treat
the finally adopted changes as a political question, although the courts will prevent the convention from
usurping the powers of other departments."
"If it be held that the question raised on the record is
a political one, that would be decisive against the petitioners."
Loring vs. Young, 239 Mass. 350.
(33) At 361 that Court pointed out a weakness in advisory opinions:
"When called to decide the same matter coming before
them as a Court, the justices are bound most seduously
to guard against any influence flowing from their previous consideration in their advisory capacity."
In the instant case the personnel of the Court are not confronted with that situation. It comes to them "de novo."
(34) In the final analysis of the matters set out in this
argument, there are, at least, two unanswerable reasons
which lead to an affirmative answer to the questions submitted in the first subdivision of the request presented by
Governor Green:
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The obsolescence of Art, XIII of the Constitution,
entitled, "Of Amendments". It has been legally impossible,
since November 1900, when the day of election was changed
from "in April" to "the Tuesday after the first Monday of
November
to submit proposals of amendment.
There was
no substitute provided for the submission to the electors "in
April", when the Constitution was amended changing the
day of election, as called for in Art. X I I I "Of Amendments",
to "the Tuesday after the first Monday in
November.
So that, for more than 34 years, there has been no provision
for submission of amendments by the General Assembly.
This is true, notwithstanding the fact that Art. XII, XIII,
XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX, and X X "Of
Amendments" appear to have been adopted on dates subsequent to the adoption of Art. XI, Sec. 2, which changed the
day of town and ward meetings from April to November.
As already pointed out, all sections of the Constitution inconsistent with Sec. 2 of Art. X I were annulled by Sec. 12
of that article. Art. XIII is clearly inconsistent.
Assuming, but not conceding, the next preceding position
to be untenable, the case of "In Re, Constitutional Convention," 14 R. I. 649, which is but an advisory opinion, is contrary to the unanimous line of authority.
(35) The Court should do with that case as it did in
Allen vs. Danielson, 15 R, I. 480 when it overruled Knowles
vs. Petitioner, 13 R. I. 90; i. e., bring the law of this jurisdiction into harmony with what other jurisdictions hold it to
be, p. 483:
"And that by doing so we shall not only establish the
correct rule, but also which is no inconsiderable gain,
establish the rule which is generally prevalent elsewhere."
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CONCLUSION
(36) The conclusion at which the Court is asked to arrive, in the light of the authorities before it, is stated in
Horton vs. City of Newport, 27 R. I. 283, at 294:
"It is needless to say, in view of all these matters, that
the Court in this instance does not find that the act in
question is in violation of Art. IV, Sec. 10, of the Constitution; but, on the contrary finds that this exercise
of legislative power is well within the provisions of the
Constitution."
Nunnemacher vs. State, 129 Wis. 190:
"It should be cause for much gratification to all who appreciate the principles of constitutional liberty, now so
signally vindicated, that rising above the influence of
mere precedent, the court has the courage to cut loose
from a judicial error that has been almost universally
proclaimed by the courts of this country for many years
again demonstrating that
" 'Truth crushed to earth shall rise again;
The eternal years of God are hers;
But Error, wounded, writhes with pain,
And dies among his worshipers.' "
The writer thanks the Court for the privilege of submitting his views on what is recognized as a matter of lasting
importance to the people of this State. He further requests
the Court by its opinion to give renewed expression to the
Rhode Island idea of civil government stated by Roger
Williams, nearly three centuries ago:
"Whereas they say, that the Civill Power may erect and
establish what forms of civill Government may seem in
Wisdome most meet, I acknowledge the Proposition to
be most true. * * * But from this Grant I infer, (as before hath been touched) that the Sovereign, original,
and foundation of Civill power lies in the People, (whom
they must needs mean by the civill power distinct from
the Government set up.) And if so, that a People may
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erect and establish what forms of Government seemes to
them most meete for their civill condition. It is evident
that such Governments as are by them erected and established, have no more power, nor for no longer time,
than the civill power or people consenting and agreeing
shall betrust them with. This is cleere not only in Reason, but in the experience of all commonweales, where
the people are not deprived of their naturall freedom by
the power of the tyrants."
Dr. Charles Carroll, "Three Centuries of Democracy":
"In this also lies the promise for the future of Rhode Island. Rhode Island in the twentieth century is still a
state in which widely different cultures meet and mingle
peaceably and harmoniously because Rhode Island is
still engaged in the lively experiment. No good Rhode
Islander may venture to think that in the century we
have reached more than the ever present, and that there
is no future. The future is plainly indicated by the past.
Rhode Island will go forward, as always through the
past three centuries, still leading the nation and the
world to new visions of democracy made real in the exemplification of the Rhode Island principles."
Respectfully submitted,
T H O M A S F . COONEY.
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Personnel of Convention Which Adopted the Constitution
Operative "The First Tuesday of May in the Year
One Thousand Eight Hundred and Forty Three."
Newport:
Henry Y. Cranston
Richard K. Randolph
Edward W. Lawton
William Ennis
Providence:
Charles F. Tillinghast
Charles Jackson
William Tollman
James Fenner
Isaac Thurber
Nehemiah R. Knight
Portsmouth:
Joseph Childs
James Chase
Warwick:
John J. Wood
William Rhodes
William Sprague
George A. Brayton
Westerly:
George D. Cross
Daniel Babcock
New Shoreham:
William P. Sheffield
Simon R. Sands
North Kingstown:
Sylvester G. Shearman
Asa B. Waite
South Kingstown:
Wilkins Updike
William A. Robinson
Elisha R. Potter
East Greenwich:
James Reynolds
Hollis K. Jenks
Jamestown:
Robert H. Watson
George Knowles
Smithfield:
Samuel B. Harris
Charles Moies
Nathaniel B. Sprague
Edward H. Sprague
Scituate:
Job Randall
Israel Brayton
Robert Potter
North Providence:
Gideon L. Spencer
Andrew Almy
Henry B. Lyman

Barrington:
Lewis B. Smith
Nathaniel Brown
Charlestown:
Samuel Ward
John Stanton
West Greenwich :
Robert Hazard
John James
Coventry:
Peleg Wilbur
John Vaughan
Ethan Angell
Exeter:
Christopher C. Green
James T. Harris
Middletown:
Pardon Brown
Abner Peckham
Bristol:
Nathaniel Bullock
Byron Diman
Peter Church
Tiverton:
Job Durfee
William Bateman
Joseph Osborne
Little Compton:
Jediah Shaw
Ezerah Coe
Warren:
Joseph Smith
Henry Saunders
Cumberland:
Aaron Rathbun
Ariel Cook
Samuel F. Man
Richmond:
Wanton Lillibridge
Charles Anthony
Cranston:
George Burton
Caleb Congdon
Hopkinton:
Edward Barber
John H. Wells
Johnston:
James F. Simmons
Olney Hendrick
Foster:
William G. Stone
Horace Howard
Burrillville:
Dana Wheelock
Willard Esten

